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I. INTRODUCTION
Elite athletes who compete in the Olympics and other international
sporting competitions undoubtedly train intensely at their sport. These
athletes devote much of their lives and their physical, mental, and financial
resources to reach the level of participating in top international sporting
competitions. Athletes competing in this select arena understand that they
must abide by the rules of their sport and competition. The mandatory rules
governing participation in international sporting competition encompass
much more than what happens among competitors on the field, court, or race
course. As a condition of participating in international sporting competition,
athletes generally waive rights to judicial recourse in their national courts
and agree to mandatory arbitration of disputes regarding eligibility or
discipline to the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS).' Further, athletes
must comply with the strictures against doping under the World Anti-
* Associate Dean for Research & Professor of Law, Pepperdine University School of Law. The
author gratefully acknowledges Kris Knaplund, Kay Reeves, Richard McLaren, Amy Schwartz, and
Michael Wagner for providing helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper, and Pepperdine
law students Nick Ashley, Kirk Pearson, and Anthony Greco for outstanding research assistance.
The author also thanks the parties, legal counsel, and arbitral panel in USADA v. Landis, for
providing the public an insight into the anti-doping arbitration process through the public hearings
held at Pepperdine University School of Law in May 2007.
1. International Olympic Committee, Olympic Charter, Rule 59 (2007),
http://multimedia.olympic.org/pdf/enreport_122.pdf [hereinafter "Olympic Charter"] ("Any
disputes arising on the occasion of, or in connection with, the Olympic Games, shall be submitted
exclusively to the Court of Arbitration for Sport, in accordance with the Code of Sports-Related
Arbitration."). All international sports federations have adopted CAS jurisdiction for dispute
resolution. See infra Part 1.B.
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Doping Code (Code) and are subject to regular and random drug testing, in
and out of competition.2
An athlete's life and livelihood can come to an abrupt halt upon a report
by doping authorities that the athlete has tested positive for a prohibited
substance, or upon a ruling by a sporting authority that the athlete is
ineligible to compete.3 Doping in sport is a serious offense. Doping by
athletes threatens not only their health and the fairness to competitors, but
also the integrity of the sport itself.4 Intentional doping is cheating.
Detecting doping is often complicated, as it can occur in elusive,
sophisticated, and sometimes undetectable forms. 5 The international sport
community has mobilized in the fight against doping, and adopted a world
code against doping, which calls for strict liability against athletes found
guilty of doping. Increasingly, athletes charged with doping in sport face
subsequent criminal charges in national courts.6
2. Olympic Charter, supra note 1, at Rule 44. See World Anti-Doping Agency, World Anti-
Doping Code (2003), http://www.wada-ama.org/rtecontent/document/codey3.pdf [hereinafter
"WADC 2003"]. The Code was first adopted in 2003, effective in 2004. Id. In 2007, the Code was
substantially revised and put into effect in January 2009. World Anti-Doping Agency, World Anti-
Doping Code (2009), http://www.wada-ama.org/rtecontent/documentcode-v2009-En.pdf
[hereinafter "WADC 2009"]. International sports federations have likewise adopted WADC
standards into their respective regulations. See infra Part II.B and note 70.
3. See Olympic Swimmer Jessica Hardy "I'm Innocent," USA TODAY, July 15, 2008,
available at http://www.usatoday.com/sports/olympics/beijing/swimming/2008-07-25-hardy-
dopingN.htm ("She's known as a doper."). The news of a positive doping test or other adverse
eligibility determination can be devastating for the athlete. Two weeks before the 2008 Summer
Olympics, U.S. swimmer and medalist hopeful Jessica Hardy was shocked to learn that she had
tested positive for a banned substance. Id. Hardy, who proclaimed her innocence, described this
experience as "the worst in her life" and said that she vomited from anxiety. Id.
4. See generally Olympic Charter, Mission and Role of the IOC, supra note 1, at 14-15.
5. Reliable testing technology may lag behind detecting new drugs or forms of doping.
Jessica K. Foschi, Note, A Constant Battle: The Evolving Challenges in the International Fight
Against Doping in Sport, 16 DuKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 457, 470 (2006). For example, tests had not
been developed to detect tetrahydrogestrinome (THG or "the Clear"), a steroid distributed by the
Bay Area Laboratory Cooperative (BALCO), until a track coach mailed a syringe containing THG to
USADA. Id. at 470. Similarly, cheaters were ahead of authorities in blood doping of erythropoietin
(EPO). Id. at 471.
6. See, e.g., Richard Sandomir & Michael S. Schmidt, Congress Requests Clemens Inquiry,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2008, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/28/sports/baseball/28clemens.html?r= I &scp=4&sq=clemens%20p
erjury&st=cse. Roger Clemens faces potential perjury charges for allegedly lying about his use of
illegal substances. Id. On February 28, 2008, a Congressional committee asked the Justice
Department to investigate whether Clemens made false statements under oath about his use of
steroids and human growth hormone. Id. Miguel Tejada pleaded guilty to perjury about his use of
performance enhancing drugs in his Congressional testimony. See Tejada Pleads Guilty to Charge
of Lying, ESPN.com, Feb. 12, 2009, http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/news/story?id-389948 (last
visited Oct. 27, 2009). See also Matthew J. Mitten, Symposium: From Grand Slams to Juries:
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While the scientific and sporting communities have developed exacting
standards for testing and laboratory practices, testing is not infallible, and
not all positive tests are caused by intentional doping, athlete negligence, or
competitor sabotage.' For example, a prohibited substance can be as
innocuous as an ingredient in a nutritional supplement, hair restoration
product, or Vicks Vapo Inhaler.t So imagine the state of an accused,
possibly innocent, athlete on the eve of the Olympics or major competition,
or after seemingly winning a gold medal or major title. The accusation
alone converts the admired athlete into an apparent pariah. The years an
athlete spends focused on training, competing, and working with coaches
and teammates hardly prepares him or her for the complex process involved
in clearing his or her name, and taking on the system that could render the
Performance-Enhancing Drug Use in Sports, 40 NEW ENG. L. REV. 797, 807 (2006) (noting
governmental authority to prosecute athletes who violate controlled substances laws).
7. For example, some prohibited substances are of an endogenous nature and naturally
produced in the human body, such as testosterone. Accurately defining a prohibited (T/E) ratio
applicable to all athletes is controversial.
WADA must somehow define the illegal level; yet, on the other hand scientists have
conducted studies to show that humans (especially elite athletes) can naturally produce
levels higher than those provided for under the Code. If true, the imperfect science
behind these ratios are putting athletes at risk for false positive testing results.
See Foshi, supra note 5, at 472. See also Strahm, et. al., Steroid Profiles of Professional Soccer
Players: An International Comparative Study, BRIT. J. SPORTS MED., Mar. 12, 2009, available at
http://bjsm.bmj.com/cgi/rapidpdf/bjsm.2008.056242vl (concluding, in study conducted by WADA
lab in Lausanne, Switzerland, that the T/E ratio test is "not fit for purpose").
8. See Richard H. McLaren, WADA Drug Testing Standards, 18 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 1, 3
(2007) (noting tests that found a significant number of non-prohibited supplements contained
prohibited substances creating both "false positive and false negatives"). U.S. skeleton sled racer
Zach Lund was suspended one year due to his use of a hair restoration product which caused a
positive test, even though he had listed this on his Doping Control form. WADA v. Lund, CAS No.
06/001, at 3 (2006). Briton Alain Baxter was forced to forfeit his bronze medal in the 2002 Winter
Games in Salt Lake City because of his use of Vicks Vapor Inhaler for congestion; the brand he
purchased in the United States contained a different chemical compound than that sold in England.
Michael A. Hiltzik, Athlete's Unbeatable Foe, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2006, available at
http://www.latimes.com/news/la-sp-dopingl Odec 10,1,1552018.story?page=5. Although finding that
swimmer Kicker Vencill's positive test was caused by a manufacturer's contamination of a multi-
vitamin, the arbitral panel ordered a two-year suspension, "just as in case of. . . 'intentional
doping."' Id. The athlete had to pay a private lab to test all nutritional supplements he had taken to
identify the source of the positive test. Id. Andreea Raducan was required to surrender her gold
medal in the 2000 Summer Games due to use of an over-the-counter cold medication given by the
team doctor. Ryan Connolly, Note, Balancing the Justices in Anti-Doping Law: The Need to Ensure
Fair Athletic Competition Through Effective Anti-Doping Programs vs. the Protection of Rights of
Accused Athletes, 5 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 161, 181 (2006).
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athlete ineligible, banned from sport, and possibly subject to criminal
liability. 9
Athletes in professional sporting leagues in the United States, such as
baseball, hockey, football, basketball, and soccer, are also members of their
respective sports' players' association (Players' Union), which operates as a
labor union. These athletes are subject to mandatory arbitration pursuant to
collective bargaining between the league and Players' Union. As the
certified bargaining representative, the Players' Union is bound by law to act
in good faith in representing its members and can assist the athlete in
obtaining representation. Thus, when a professional athlete in the United
States becomes involved in a disciplinary action, the athlete has access to
representation through the Players' Union.' 0 Persons charged with criminal
offenses by public authorities may also have a right to counsel, including
appointed counsel for defendants who cannot procure counsel on their
own. 11
By contrast, individual athletes participating in international sporting
competitions lack an institutional support system that can advise athletes of
their legal rights and provide effective representation. Frequently, athletes
are informed of disciplinary charges on the eve, or in the midst, of major
competitions. Athletes operating in this international sporting environment
cannot obtain judicial recourse through their local (or any) court system.
Rather, as a condition of participation, all athletes are required to consent to
resolve any disputes exclusively by arbitration through the CAS. 12 Although
the arbitration process through the CAS provides a procedure for an
expedited hearing and disposition, realistically the athlete has limited time
(or resources) in which to ascertain the issues he or she faces. Such
restraints make it difficult to identify and obtain qualified legal
representation, as well as the scientific expertise needed to investigate the
charges and to present a comprehensive defense. Athletes find themselves
9. Disgraced Olympic sprinter Marion Jones faced criminal penalties, including jail time, for
lying to federal prosecutors. See also Paul C. McCaffrey, Note, Playing Fair: Why the United States
Anti-Doping Agency's Performance-Enhanced Adjudications Should Be Treated as State Action, 22
WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 645,659-60, n.113 (2006) (noting that "[i]t is a federal crime to possess, use,
or traffic in some of the substances included on the Code's Prohibited List [and that] ... [d]oping
offenses are criminal offenses in several European nations, including Greece, Belgium, France, and
Italy").
10. See Mark M. Rabuano, An Examination of Drug-Testing as a Mandatory Subject of
Collective Bargaining in Major League Baseball, 4 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 439, 441 (2002).
11. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (establishing a criminal defendant's right to
counsel under the Sixth Amendment). This right is also codified in numerous state laws. See 50
State Statutory Surveys, Right to Appointed Counsel, Thomson Reuters West (June 2009).
12. Olympic Charter, supra note 1. This requirement is incorporated into the international
sporting federation rules.
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up against a well-financed and experienced machine in the anti-doping
agency, sporting federation, or governing body seeking sanction against the
athlete. 3
World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) rules purport to provide the
athlete a "right to a fair hearing."' 4  However, the applicable rules,
participants, and system for arbitrating a doping charge are markedly
different from a court of law. Under WADA rules, the doping report,
conducted only by a WADA-accredited laboratory, is presumed valid.15 The
burden is on the athlete, who is likely at an information and resource
disadvantage, to come forward with evidence that rebuts the presumption of
doping, by showing the laboratory's practice departed from international
standards. 16 Even where the athlete can demonstrate a failure in
compliance, such mistakes are excused unless found to be the cause of the
adverse analytical finding.' 7 This is a significant challenge indeed.
U.S. cyclist Floyd Landis aspired to take on the U.S. Anti-Doping
Agency (USADA) when his 2006 title to the Tour de France became
jeopardized by the report of a positive doping test conducted by a French
laboratory. Unlike most athletes, Landis was able to mobilize the financial
resources to hire proficient counsel and experts, to engage in detailed
discovery of lab testing practices, to pursue the first public arbitration by an
international athlete, and then to appeal the adverse ruling de novo to the
13. The International Olympic Committee (IOC) provided the initial $25 million to establish
WADA and covers 50% of its annual budget. See Jeff Passan, No Joy in Mudslinging for MLB,
WADA, YAHOO! SPORTS, Jan. 18, 2008, http://sports.yahoo.com/mlb/news?slug-jp-wadamlb0l 1808
(last visited Oct. 27, 2009). National Doping Agencies receive funding from National Olympic
Committees (NOCs) and International Federations (IF)s. USADA is funded by over $8 million in
federal grants and $4 million from the United States Olympic Committee (USOC). See UNITED
STATES ANTI-DOPING AGENCY, 2007 ANNUAL REPORT 12, available at
http://www.usantidoping.org/files/active/who/annual-report-2007.pdf USADA has a professional
staff, board of directors, in-house counsel and retained law firms. See United States Anti-Doping
Agency, Meet USADA, http://www.usantidoping.org/who/meet/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2009).
14. WADC 2003, supra note 2, at art. 8; WADC 2009, supra note 2, at art. 8.
15. Id. at art. 3.2.1.
16. WADC 2003, supra note 2, at art. 3.1. See also MCLAREN, supra note 8, at 23; Michael S.
Straubel, Doping Due Process: A Critique of the Doping Control Process in International Sport, 106
DICK. L. REV. 523, 544-45 (2002) ("To begin, tests conducted by a certified laboratory are presumed
accurate; therefore, the athlete has the burden of impeaching the results"); Andrew Goldstone,
Obstruction of Justice: The Arbitration Process for Anti-Doping Violations During the Olympic
Games, 7 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 361, 383 (2006).
17. See infra Part lII.A. I (regarding enhanced burden of proof upon athlete under WADC
2009).
9
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international Court of Arbitration for Sport.' 8 This uphill legal battle cost
Landis over $2 million. 19 The CAS panel not only affirmed Landis's
disqualification but also imposed a $100,000 sanction against Landis
personally for having asserted "unfounded allegations" of misconduct
against the French laboratory.2 ° The cycling federation refused to authorize
Landis to compete, even upon expiration of his two-year suspension, until he
satisfied the $100,000 fine. 21 Landis then filed a lawsuit in U.S. federal
court seeking to vacate the CAS award and penalty.22 Although the federal
suit raised many questions, the very public case ended by stipulated
dismissal and a confidential settlement which ultimately allowed Landis to
compete upon conclusion of his suspension.
What are the lessons to athletes and policymakers from USADA v.
Landis? Based on the price tag alone, few athletes could mount a similar
18. USADA v. Landis, AAA No. 30 190 0084 06 (2007) (majority opinion), available at
http://www.usada.org/files/active/arbitration-rulings/Landis%2Fina1%20(20-09-07)%20(3).pdf
[hereinafter Landis 1]. The perception or reality of unfairness in the anti-doping process apparently
motivated supporters of Floyd Landis to mobilize and fund his defense via the Floyd Fairness Fund.
Landis' case was followed closely and virtually worldwide on the internet. See, e.g., Trust But
Verify, News, Research and Commentary About the Floyd Landis Doping Allegations,
http://trustbut.com (last visited Oct. 27, 2009). Landis's appeal to the public became known as the
"Wiki Defense," by internet postings of his test documents in hopes of "unearthing experts and
explanations" for his suspicious test resuls. See Jennifer Hughes, The Wiki Defense: What Floyd
Landis Taught the Press About Drug Testing, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., June 2007,
http://www.cjr.org/on the-job/the wiki defense.php (last visited Oct. 27, 2009) (noting the flurry of
online debates in blogs and chat rooms about the Landis case, including responses by scientists,
experts, and journalists questioning the testing and documents). "Wiki" refers to "the open editing
systems best embodied by Wikipedia, the online encyclopedia that relies on a wisdom-of-the crowds
approach to verifying the accuracy of its entries." Id. See also ARNIE BAKER, MD, THE WIKI
DEFENSE, available at http://amiebakercycling.com/books/wiki.htm.
19. Although victorious, USADA spent a comparable amount in prosecuting the Landis case:
Two years, close to $4 million spent by both sides combined, and an unquantifiable
amount of collateral damage later, Floyd Landis' doping case rolled across what is
normally the administrative finish line .... The Court of Arbitration for Sport released
its ruling upholding a lower panel's opinion that Landis was guilty as charged of using
synthetic testosterone to boost his performance in the 2006 Tour de France.
See Bonnie D. Ford, Landis May Not Race Again, But He's Not Done Fighting, ESPN.com, July 1,
2008, http://sports.espn.go.com/oly/cycling/columns/story?id=3468423 (last visited Oct. 27, 2009).
20. Arbitration CAS 2007/A/1394, Landis v. USADA, award of 30 June 2008 [hereinafter
Landis 11].
21. Bonnie D. Ford, In U.S. Federal Court Motion, Landis Claims Arbitrators Had Conflicts
of Interest, ESPN.com, Sept. 26, 2008,
http://sports.espn.go.com/oly/cycling/news/storyid=3611019 (reporting Landis's filing a lawsuit in
U.S. District Court in Los Angeles, which seeks to vacate the CAS decision and fine on the grounds
of arbitrator bias and conflicts due to repeat roles as arbitrators and anti-doping counsel).
22. See Landis v. USADA, Petition to Vacate Arbitration Award (C.D. Cal. 2008) [hereinafter
Landis I1]. See also Landis Drops Suit, VELO NEWS, Dec. 6, 2005,
http://www.velonews.com/article/85653 (last visited Oct. 27, 2009).
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challenge. Furthermore, if the Landis team was unable to break a chink in
the armor of USADA, which has lost only one doping challenge to date,
fewer athletes are likely to attempt to do so. 23 Is it the case that USADA is
nearly always right and WADA testing is infallible, or possibly that most
athletes realize that this is one contest they cannot win? 24 Even assuming
WADA lab test reports are completely reliable, are athletes afforded due
process to adequately protect their rights under the current system? How is
an athlete's "right to a fair hearing" effectuated in a system that places the
burden on the accused to prove test invalidity, without explicit provision for
access to discovery, neutral scientific evaluation, or legal representation?
This Article considers the legal framework, process, and recourse for
athletes in international competition to address sporting eligibility and
disciplinary actions, particularly from the perspective of the accused athlete
facing ineligibility sanction from sporting competition. Part II describes the
rules and governing bodies in Olympic and international sporting
competition pursuant to the Olympic Charter, which provides the regulatory
framework for international sports. Part III examines the interplay between
the doping arbitration rules and an athlete's right to a fair hearing,
identifying the significant procedural barriers in the designated arbitral
process. Part IV considers options for providing athletes with improved
access to justice through procedural changes and access to legal advice and
representation, including expert scientific evaluation, as well as other forms
of legal assistance and insurance programs when contesting eligibility or
discipline. This Article argues that athletes who are required to submit to
mandatory drug testing, with attendant potential criminal liability, and to
mandatory arbitration, should be provided meaningful access to competent
legal representation when their athletic careers are in jeopardy. A proposed
23. USADA's only loss to date came in January 2008. See USADA v. Jenkins, AAA No. 30
190 00199 07 (2008) (setting aside laboratory results where athlete established that the same lab
technician had tested the athlete's 'A' and 'B' samples, in violation of international standards, and
where USADA did not show the violation did not cause the adverse finding). Under the 2009 Code,
the "same operator" problem is no longer considered an ISL violation. See generally WADC 2009,
supra note 2.
24. See World Anti-Doping Agency, Minutes from Executive Board Meeting, Nov. 22, 2008,
available at http://www.wada-
ama.org/rtecontent/documentEXCO-minutes_22Nov08-posted_ 20509.pdf (reporting lower
budget forecast for next year, and sincerely hoping "that the message had been sent loud and clear
from the CAS in relation to Mr. Landis would mean that athletes would understand that expensive
attacks on the system, which is what Landis had done, would not be possible. The message was
clear that the system was there and worked properly.").
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model of athlete advisors or legal representatives can mirror the roster
system used for CAS arbitrators, so athlete advocates can adequately advise
athletes and avoid unwarranted challenges. Specialized training regarding
the science of testing and doping should be provided to the panel of athlete
advocates, similar to that provided to arbitrators and doping authorities.
II. REGULATORY FRAMEWORK AND DISCIPLINARY PROCESS IN OLYMPIC
AND INTERNATIONAL SPORTS
A. Governing Bodies in International Sports
The organizational and regulatory structure for Olympic and
international sports competition is based upon the Olympic Movement, as
set out in the Olympic Charter.25 The Olympic Movement consists of
governing bodies operating within an international and domestic
organizational structure.2 6  At the pinnacle of this structure is the
International Olympic Committee (IOC), a non-profit, non-governmental
organization formed and operating in Lausanne, Switzerland, under Swiss
law.27 Under the Olympic Charter, the IOC possesses the rights to and
governs the operation of the Olympics, and is the "final authority on all
questions concerning the Olympic Games and the Olympic Movement.,
28
The IOC recognizes, among other things, two categories of governing
bodies, which play a prominent role in the Olympic movement.
International Sports Federations (IFs) administer Olympic programs for a
particular sport, conduct international competitions, and define the eligibility
and technical rules for international competition. 29 For each participating
country, the IOC also recognizes a National Olympic Committee (NOC),
and considers these NOCs "the sole authorities responsible for the
representation of their respective countries at the Olympic Games as well as
25. Olympic Charter, Introduction, supra note 1, at 10 (noting the Olympic Charter governs
the organization, action, and operation of the Olympic Movement, serves as the statutes of the IOC,
and defines the reciprocal rules and obligations of the three main constituents of the Olympic
Movement, namely the IOC, the IFs, and NOCs).
26. Id. at Rule 1. See also id., Fundamental Principles of Olympism, at 12 ("Every individual
must have the possibility of practicing sport, without discrimination of any kind and in the Olympic
spirit, which requires mutual understanding with a spirit of friendship, solidarity, and fair play.").
27. Id. at Rule 15.
28. Id. at Rule 19(3). See also id. at Rule 15 ("The decisions of the IOC are final. Any
dispute relating to their application may be resolved ... in certain cases, by arbitration before the
Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS).").
29. Id. at Rule 27.
8
Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal, Vol. 10, Iss. 1 [2010], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol10/iss1/2
[Vol. 10: 1, 2009]
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL
at other events held under the patronage of the IOC."3° These NOCs in turn
recognize separate national governing bodies (NGBs) within their countries
responsible for managing each Olympic sport and the selection of athletes.
NGBs are also members of their respective sport's international federation.3
In addition, the Olympic Movement includes the Organizing Committees of
the Olympic Games (OCOGs), and, "[o]f course, the athletes. 32
1. Role and Function of the International Federations (IFs)
The IOC currently recognizes thirty-five international sporting
federations.33 Among these are the International Cycling Union (UCI), the
International Athletic Association Federation (IAAF) for track and field, and
Federation International de Natation (FINA) for swimming.34 IFs are
responsible for establishing and enforcing the rules concerning the practice
of their respective sport worldwide. 35 The IFs determine the rules for status
and eligibility, which apply to all athletes and national governing bodies for
international competition in a particular sport. IFs retain authority to review
decisions of an NGB, which may be subject to conflicting authority by its
respective NOC.36 Disputes among these governing bodies may be referred
to arbitration or resolved by the IOC. 37  Although they may receive
30. YASSER, McCuRDY, GOPLERUD & WESTON, SPORTS LAW: CASES & MATERIALS 967 (6th
ed. 2007); See Olympic Chartersupra note 1, at Rule 28 §3.
31. YASSER, supra note 30, at 967.
32. Olympic Movement, Who Is the Olympic Movement?,
http://www.olympic.org/uk/organisation/index-uk.asp (last visited Oct. 27, 2009) ("The Olympic
Movement includes the International Olympic Committee (IOC), Organizing Committees of the
Olympic Games (OCOGs), the National Olympic Committees (NOCs), the International Federations
(IFs), the national associations, clubs, and, of course, the athletes.").
33. Olympic Charter, supra note 1, at Rule 26.
34. See, e.g., Federation Intemationale de Natation, http://www.fina.org (last visited Oct. 27,
2009); International Athletic Association Federation, http://www.iaaf.org (last visited Oct. 27,
2009); International Cycling Union, http://www.uci.ch (last visited Oct. 27, 2009).
35. Olympic Charter, supra note 1, at Rule 27 §1.1.
36. Reynolds v. Int'l Amateur Athletic Fed'n, 23 F.3d 1110 (6th Cir. 1994) is the leading
example of the potential for procedural quagmire in international sports. The IAAF refused to
accept the U.S. arbitral award or order by the U.S. Supreme Court to allow the athlete to compete
and ultimately escaped liability for a $27.3 million judgment due to lack of personal jurisdiction over
IAAF in the United States. Id. at 1118-19. See also Mary K. Fitzgerald, The Court of Arbitration
for Sport: Dealing with Doping and Due Process During the Olympics, 7 SPoRTS L.J. 213, 219
(2000) (describing TAC, the NGB, as "caught in the crossfire between the U.S. courts and the
IAAF.").
37. Id. at 215.
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government support, IFs are considered non-profit organizations of private
law. IFs receive funding from media, governmental, and commercial
sources. 38
2. Role of the National Olympic Committee - USOC
The United States Olympic Committee (USOC) serves as the national
representative of the United States to the IOC. The USOC is chartered by
Congress under the Amateur Sports Act of 1978 (ASA) to act as the
exclusive governing body for U.S. participation in the Olympic and Pan-
American Games.39 Pursuant to the Act, the USOC recognizes a single
sports organization to act as the NGB for each sport. 40  The NGBs in turn
represent the United States in international sporting federations, coordinate
athletic competitions, and recommend individuals and teams to the USOC to
represent the United States in international sporting competitions. 41  The
ASA also requires the USOC to hire an ombudsman to provide independent
advice to athletes, at no cost, about applicable laws and procedures.42 The
Athlete Ombudsman does not represent the athlete, but the athlete can invite
the Ombudsman to attend hearings. Communications between the
Ombudsman and athlete are confidential.43 In addition, the USOC contracts
with USADA "to conduct drug testing, manage test results and adjudicate
disputes for participants in the Olympic movement within the United
States .... ."44
The USOC has a substantial budget, as the recipient of funding from
Olympic-related broadcasting proceeds, sponsorships, and trademark
contracts. The USOC budget increased from $2.2 million in 1988, to $30
38. See International Sports Federation, Charter, available at
http://www.getbig.com/info/ifbb/faq-isfc.htm.
39. 36 U.S.C. § 220503(3) (1998). In 1998, the Act was amended and renamed the Ted
Stevens Olympic & Amateur Sports Act, 36 U.S.C. §§ 220501-220529.
40. Id. § 220503.
41. Id. § 220523(a).
42. 36 U.S.C. § 220509(b)(1)(A) (2006). See also USOC Athletes' Advisory Council,
Bylaws, at § VII (2006), available at http://teamusa.org/content/index/1585 (describing role and
function of the ombudsman). Since 1999, John Ruger has served as the USOC Athlete Ombudsman.
http://www.usocpressbox.org/usoc/Pressbox.nsf/AllDocsUNID/459158F638A2832F8725726B0069
EB85/$FILE/Ruger,%2OJohn.pdfopen.
43. Id. at VII.(B)(3). The Athlete Ombudsman reports directly to the Chair of the Athletes'
Advisory Council (AAC), which is composed of "one representative from each Olympic and Pan
American sport elected from the National Governing Body (NGB) of each sport." Id. at II(A). The
mission of the AAC is "[t]o communicate the interests and protect the rights of athletes, in
cooperative support of the USOC achieving its mission." Id. at I.
44. United States Anti-Doping Agency, Protocol for Olympic Movement Testing § 1 (2004).
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million just before the 1996 Olympic Games in Atlanta.45 In 2005, the
USOC was to spend $45.8 million on NGBs and athlete support, and another
$15.2 million on Olympic training centers in Colorado, New York, and
California.46 The USOC provides stipends, coaching, and training support
for Olympic athletes. 47 The overall proposed budget for the USOC between
2006 and 2008, a time period that included both the 2006 Winter Games in
Turin and the 2008 Summer Games in Beijing, was $575 million.4 8
Additionally, in 2007, fully seventy percent of the USOC's $180.6 million
budget was spent on athlete services. 49 However, these services do not
include the payment of defense costs to athletes accused of anti-doping
violations.
a. AAA Arbitration under the Amateur Sports Act (ASA)
A primary purpose of the ASA is to provide for the prompt resolution of
disputes. 50 The ASA charges the USOC to provide "swift resolution of
conflict and disputes" involving athletes and its member organizations and
"to protect the opportunity of an athlete.., to participate in amateur athletic
competition.""1  Translated, this means that athletes must submit all
eligibility-related disputes to arbitration, rather than to the courts. The Act
45. See Melissa R. Bitting, Mandatory, Binding Arbitration for Olympic Athletes: Is the
Process Better or Worse for Job Security?, 25 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 655, 664-65 (1998).
46. Eddie Pells, USOC Budget Keeps Money Flowing Towards Athletes, Feb. 15, 2005,
available at http://signonsandiego.com/sports/20050215-1558-oly-usoc-budget.html.
47. Bitting, supra note 45, at 666 (reporting that the USOC provides up to $15,000, in addition
to cash awards for medals). Participation in sports is employment for many Olympic athletes;
approximately 1,600 athletes rely on USOC monthly stipends. Id. Other sources of athlete income
include commercial endorsements, and appearance fees. Id.
48. USOC Says Budget Is Fine, ESPN.com, Jan. 6, 2005,
http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/print?id=1961096&type=story (last visited Oct. 27, 2009).
49. James Jarman, USOC Cuts Budget and Claims to Give More to Athletes Than Tax Filings
Show, KOAA.com, Nov. 26, 2008, available at
http://www.koaa.com/aaaa-top-stories/x 1589516783/USOC-cuts-budget-claims-to-give-more-to-
athletes-than-tax-filings-show.
50. Dolan v. U.S. Equestrian Team, 608 A.2d 434, 437 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992)
(noting the history of in-fighting for NGB recognition as impetus for requiring arbitration).
51. 36 U.S.C. §§ 220503(8), 220509(a). The term "amateur" in the Act is dated and does not
accurately reflect that the Act covers both professional and amateur athletes who participate in
international-level competition. Since 1992, the international federations have been conferred the
authority to open eligibility to professional and amateur athletes, and most athletes competing at the
elite level of the Olympic Games "are in fact professionals." Maidie E. Oliveau, Navigating the
Labyrinth of "Amateur" Sports ADR Procedures, 13 Disp. RESOL. J. 6, 6-7 (2007).
15
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authorizes an aggrieved party to appeal an NGB or USOC determination to
the American Arbitration Association (AAA) for a binding determination.12
USADA has incorporated this provision for first-instance domestic
arbitration of doping charges. 3 The arbitration is before a panel of three
arbitrators, unless agreed otherwise, and according to the ASA, "[s]hall be
open to the public," although this latter provision has only been invoked
once and with dubious success.54 Recourse through the judicial system is
limited, because applicable administrative remedies through domestic
arbitration must be exhausted. 5
b. Interplay between the ASA and International Codes
While Congress may have envisioned a streamlined procedure for
dispute resolution, Olympic athletes and the USOC must operate in a larger
international arena. Athletes in international competition are also subject to
the rules, standards and procedures of the IOC, WADA/USADA, which are
incorporated into the regulations of the athletes' respective IF, NOC, and
NGB. 56 Although the ASA does not address recourse after the initial AAA
52. 36 U.S.C. § 220529 (stating "[a] party aggrieved by the determination of the [USOC] may
obtain review" by filing a demand for arbitration with the American Arbitration Association
(AAA)). The Act precludes a court from granting injunctive relief within twenty-one days of the
start of an Olympic event. Id.
53. The AAA hearings involving doping disputes are governed by commercial arbitration
rules, as modified by the "Supplementary Procedures." See American Arbitration Association,
Supplementary Procedures for the Arbitration of Anti-Doping Rule Violations, R-1,
http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=28627 (last visited Oct. 27, 2009).
54. 36 U.S.C. § 220529(b)(2)(C). See also § 220529(b)(5) (providing that the parties may
offer evidence, and that "[t]he arbitrators shall be the sole judges of the relevancy and materiality of
the evidence offered. Conformity to legal rules of evidence is not necessary."). Floyd Landis was
the first athlete to invoke his right to a public arbitration. His public arbitration process provided an
important means for transparency and a measure of accountability on the doping arbitral process.
Yet, in the second arbitration, Landis chose a closed hearing. Although the rules provide that the
hearing "shall be public," in practice, athletes opt for a private hearing. See Maureen C. Weston,
Anatomy of the First Public International Sports Arbitration: Surprising Practical, Legal and Policy
Issues in USADA v. Floyd Landis (forthcoming 2010). The advocacy strategy in a high-profile
public arbitration is complex, due to the desire to present the case to the public senses, yet also to an
apparent dispassionate arbitral panel. Landis Panel Criticizes Legal Team, GLOBAL ARB. REV., July
2, 2008, available at http://www.globalarbitrationreview.com/news/article/14646/landis-panel-
criticises-legal-team.
55. See, e.g., Lee v. Taekwondo Union, 331 F. Supp. 2d 1252 (D. Haw. 2004) (ruling federal
court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over coach's race discrimination claim due to duty to exhaust
internal remedies, i.e., arbitration); Barnes v. Int'l Amateur Athletic Fed'n, 862 F. Supp. 1537 (S.D.
W.Va. 1993). See also Jason Gubi, The Olympic Binding Arbitration Clause and the Court of
Arbitration for Sport: An Analysis of Due Process Concerns, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA &
ENT. L.J. 997, 1009 (2008).
56. Oliveau, supra note 51, at 7 (explaining how the ASA, USOC, AAA, and CAS relate).
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arbitration, rules of the governing international sporting entities provide for a
de novo hearing before an international panel of CAS arbitrators, with final
determination only by the Swiss Federal Tribunal.57 Under this ostensibly
"private law" framework, the USOC and its athletes do not have access to
U.S. courts or, necessarily, U.S. legal protections.58 Yet, whether the
international rules obligate U.S. athletes to appeal domestic arbitration
rulings exclusively to CAS, or whether they have access to domestic courts
to appeal (or seek vacatur of ) an adverse domestic arbitral ruling, continues
to be tested. 59
The IOC also recognizes two other distinct entities which are
increasingly integral to the Olympic Movement and international sport: (1)
the Court of Arbitration for Sport; and (2) the World Anti-Doping Agency.
B. Mandatory Arbitration for Athletes in the Court ofArbitration for Sport
Considering that thousands of athletes from over 200 countries
60
participate in the Olympics and international sporting competition, litigation
involving sports-related disputes could conceivably span the globe.6t After
more than a few highly contentious, costly, and negatively publicized
57. WADC 2009, supra note 2, at art. 13.2.1. See also Maureen A. Weston, Simply a Dress
Rehearsal?: U.S. Olympic Sports Arbitration and De Novo Review at the Court of Arbitration for
Sport, 38 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. (forthcoming 2009).
58. See, e.g., DeFrantz v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 492 F. Supp. 1181 (D.D.C. 1980) (ruling that
the USOC is a private, rather than state, actor, despite its significant connections with Congress);
S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 545 (1987) (rejecting claims that
the USOC's trademark ban on use of the name "Gay Olympic Games" violated First or Fifth
Amendment rights because the USOC was not a governmental actor).
59. See infra note 99 (describing vacatur efforts in Landis Ill).
60. In August 2008, China hosted the XXIX Olympiad. Nearly 11,000 athletes represented
202 countries during the two-week competition. See Beijing 2008 Olympic Games,
http://en.beijing2008.cn/media/usefulinfo/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2009). Broadcasts of the Games
were watched by billions of viewers worldwide. Id.
61. COURT OF ARBITRATION FOR SPORT, GUIDE TO ARBITRATION 1, 7, available at
http://www.sportundrecht.de/EU-Recht/CASguideArbitration.pdf (explaining suitability of
arbitration for international disputes for parties not domiciled in the same country, such as providing
a single jurisdiction and choice of law and language, as well as expertise in sports-related matters
and process flexibility). See also JOHN DEMESTRE & CO., CAS - THE COURT OF ARBITRATION FOR
SPORT (2000), available at http://fulltext.ausport.gov.au/fulltext/2000/law/jdmcas.pdf (describing
the benefits of CAS arbitration); Darren Kane, Twenty Years On: An Evaluation of the Court of
Arbitration for Sport, MELB. J. INT'L L., available at
http://austlii.law.uts.edu.au/au/journals/MelbJIL/2003/10.html (discussing the development of CAS
lex sportive).
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judicial lawsuits and interventions,62  IOC President Juan Antonio
Samaranch conceived of the idea of a single arbitral authority and tribunal
for international sports-related disputes. 63 In the early 1980s, the IOC voted
to create and approve the Court of Arbitration for Sport to serve as the
exclusive arbitral tribunal for the binding adjudication of disputes by
members of the Olympic Movement. As of 1995, the Olympic Charter
provides that "any dispute arising on the occasion of or in connection with
the Olympic Games shall be submitted exclusively to the Court of
Arbitration for Sport., 6 4 As a condition of participating in the Olympics,
athletes must sign a Court of Arbitration for Sport Waiver form and thereby
waive rights to their national courts and attendant laws and procedures.65
Arbitration clauses are incorporated into the statutes of each of the sport
federations, associations or sport bodies, and athletes are required to consent
to arbitration.66
1. CAS Operations
CAS was originally financed exclusively by the IOC, and its
membership largely comprised IOC appointments.67 In response to a
judicial decision by the Swiss Supreme Court,68 which questioned CAS
independence in light of the numerous links between the IOC and CAS, the
International Court of Arbitration for Sport (ICAS) was established to
manage and finance CAS independent of the IOC. 69 In the Paris Agreement
62. The case by Butch Reynolds against the IAAF illustrates the practical benefit of a single
arbitral form for international sports. See Reynolds v. Int'l Amateur Athletic Fed'n, 23 F.3d 1110
(6th Cir. 1994). Reynolds' lawsuit ran the litigation gamut from Ohio state court, to federal court, up
to the U.S. Supreme Court, only to be dismissed after six years for lack of personal jurisdiction. Id.
See also Bitting, supra note 45, at 660-61 (describing "the controversy that would not go away").
63. Court of Arbitration for Sport, History of the CAS, http://www.tas-cas.org/history (last
visited Oct. 27, 2009).
64. Olympic Charter, supra note 1.
65. For example, cyclists must hold a license from their national federation in order to
participate in elite international cycling events. As a condition of obtaining a license, each cyclist
agrees to CAS jurisdiction. See Landis I, supra note 18. This is not negotiable.
66. COURT OF ARBITRATION FOR SPORT, GUIDE TO ARBITRATION, supra note 61, at Appendix
I (providing standard clauses for sports entities).
67. Matthieu Reeb, The Role and Functions of the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS), in
THE COURT OF ARBITRATION FOR SPORT 32 (Ian S. Blackshaw et al. eds., 2004). ICAS serves as the
administrative arm of CAS. Fitzgerald, supra note 36, at 221.
68. Gundel v. Int'l Equestrian Fed'n, in DIGEST OF CAS AWARDS, 1986-1998, at 561
(Matthieu Reeb ed., 1998).
69. See Reeb, supra note 67, at 35 (noting that ICAS, composed of 20 high-level jurists as
members, is charged with administration and financing of CAS); Michael Straubel, Enhancing the
18
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in 1994, over thirty-one international sports federations signed an agreement
to constitute and recognize ICAS.70 CAS jurisdiction is now recognized by
all international federations and national Olympic committees, whose
bylaws, statutes, and contracts provide for CAS arbitration.
CAS is a private international arbitration tribunal based in Switzerland,
with additional offices in Sydney, Australia and New York City. Absent the
consent of the parties otherwise, CAS operates under Swiss law and in
accordance with the Code of Sports-Related Arbitration (CAS Code). 7'
CAS is structured into three divisions: (1) the Olympic Division, or Ad Hoc
Division, first used in the 1996 Atlanta Games, is on-site to resolve any
disputes arising during the Games within a twenty-four hour time period; (2)
the "Ordinary Arbitration Division" handles primarily commercial contract
disputes arising from legal relations between parties who have agreed to
dispute resolution before CAS; 72 and (3) the "Appeals Arbitration Division,"
which adjudicates disputes resulting from final-instance decisions taken by
tribunals within CAS or the sporting federations or other sports bodies.7 3
CAS also may issue Advisory Opinions, at the request of the IOCs, the IFs,
NOCs, or associations recognized by the IOC, about any legal issue with
respect to the practice of development of sport. 7
Performance of the Doping Court: How the Court ofArbitration for Sport Can Do Its Job Better, 36
Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 1206, 1212 (2006).
70. Reeb, supra note 67, at 34.
71. Court of Arbitration for Sport, Procedural Rules, available at http://www.tas-cas.org/rules
[hereinafter "CAS Code"]. The Code of Sport-Related Arbitration sets forth the procedural rules for
CAS arbitrations. Id. The Code has governed CAS arbitration procedures since November 22,
1994. The Code is comprised of sixty-nine articles, divided into: (1) Statutes of the working bodies
(arts. SI to S26); and (2) the Procedural Rules (arts. RI7-R69). Reeb, supra note 67, at 34.
72. These typically involve contractual disputes. For example, contracting parties may
designate CAS arbitration to resolve disputes such as sponsorship contract, broadcasting rights, or
employment and agency contracts involving athletes, managers, other third party liability, and civil
liability claims, such as accidents to athletes during a sports competition. These claims are
submitted to Ordinary Arbitration. Reeb, supra note 67, at 36. See also COURT OF ARBITRATION
FOR SPORT, GUIDE TO ARBITRATION, supra note 61, at 11. Ordinary arbitration proceedings are
confidential and awards not public, unless otherwise provided. CAS Code, supra note 71, at Rule
46.
73. Reeb, supra note 67, at 35. See also Fitzgerald, supra note 36, at 220 (describing four
types of disputes).
74. CAS Code, supra note 71, at Rules 60-62 (Advisory Opinion).
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2. CAS Arbitrators and Selection Process
Although ICAS formally selects arbitrators, arbitrators eligible to serve
on a CAS panel are initially proposed by the IOC, IFs, and NOCs. ICAS is
also to select one-fifth of the CAS roster "after appropriate consultation with
a view to safeguarding the interests of the athletes."75  Organizations
representing athletes, however, are not provided official participation in this
process.76 CAS arbitrators are to have legal training and recognized
competence in sports law. The arbitrators are guided by the CAS Code for
procedural rules, including obligations to carry out their functions with
objectivity and independence. 8 Once approved by ICAS, CAS arbitrators
are appointed for a renewable four-year term and included on a roster of
CAS arbitrators.7 9 In 2007, the list of CAS arbitrators included 275 persons
from seven countries.80 The roster of available CAS arbitrators is sizeable,
but in practice, the pool of arbitrators selected by parties is relatively
small. 81 Unlike public judges who work full-time as judges, CAS arbitrators
serve when appointed and otherwise engage in other professional work.
Thus, arbitrators with the requisite experience in sport may also have work
that includes representing and counseling clients in the sport industry. Until
a policy change effective January 2010, CAS rules did not prohibit members
of its arbitral pool from acting as advocates in representing clients before
other CAS panels. 82 Notwithstanding, the rules do require arbitrator
75. Id. at art. S 14.
76. Id. See also Landis 111, supra note 22; Straubel, supra note 69, at 1235-36.
77. Straubel, supra note 69, at 1233. CAS Code, supra note 71, at arts. S12-14.
78. COURT OF ARBITRATION FOR SPORT, GUIDE TO ARBITRATION, supra note 61, at 12 (noting
the Sports Code is drafted to integrate within Swiss Federal Law on Private International Law, which
governs international arbitration and is seated in Switzerland).
79. Reeb, supra note 67, at 36 (noting that the Code stipulates that the ICAS must call upon
"personalities with a legal training and who possess recognized competence with regard to sport.").
80. Figure for 2007. See Court of Arbitration for Sport, History of the CAS, http://www.tas-
cas.org/en/infogenerales.asp/4-3-238-1011-4-1-1/5-0-1011-3-0-0 (last visited Oct. 27, 2009). The
roster for the AAA Panel of North American CAS members is significantly smaller, listing thirty-
eight arbitrators. See American Arbitration Association, http://www.adr.org (last visited Oct. 27,
2009). As of May 1, 2009, the Supplementary Rules were amended and now provide that the pool
of AAA/CAS arbitrators be U.S. citizens. See American Arbitration Association, Supplementary
Procedures for the Arbitration of Anti-Doping Rule Violations, supra note 53, at R-3.
81. See Straubel, supra note 69, at 1233 (characterizing demographics of listed arbitrators as
largely homogenous in age, gender, and nationality); Landis III, supra note 22, at 21-22 (reporting
the most frequently selected arbitrators).
82. Id. at 18 (stating that "many of the most frequently-selected arbitrators are those that
continue to represent private clients [or WADA, or who have partners who do so] before CAS
panels. Powerful financial incentives clearly exist to align the financial interests of the 'judges' with
those of the 'repeat player litigants."'). See Press Release, Court of Arbitration for Sport, Court of
Arbitration for Sport Amends Its Rules (Oct. 1, 2009), available at http://www.tas-
20
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independence from the parties and disclosure of circumstances that might
likely affect the arbitrator's independence.83
3. CAS Appeals Arbitration for Disciplinary Cases
Disciplinary cases, including doping, and those concerning athlete
eligibility and field-of-play issues, are submitted to CAS Appeals
Arbitration. 84  Athletes have the option to seek a first-instance arbitration
before a domestic panel of CAS where available or to go directly to final
arbitration before CAS. 85  Both the athlete and the prosecuting authority
have the option to appeal the domestic CAS ruling by filing a request for
final arbitration to CAS within twenty-one days from the date of the
domestic ruling.86 If seeking a Panel of three arbitrators, the athlete must
designate his arbitrator in his statement of appeal, due within ten days after
the time limit for appeal expires. 87  The respondent designates its appointed
arbitrator, and the Appeals Division President appoints a third arbitrator who
cas.org/d2wfiles/document/3546/5048/0/2009.10.01 %20PR%2OEng%20FINAL.pdf (announcing
"end of the double hat arbitrator/counsel").
83. CAS Code, supra note 71, at Rule 33. Parties may also challenge an arbitrator's
independence within seven days after information giving rise to the challenge is known. Id. at Rule
34. ICAS rules on such challenges. Id.
84. COURT OF ARBITRATION FOR SPORT, GUIDE TO ARBITRATION, supra note 61, at 11.
[D]isciplinary cases are generally dealt within the first instance by the competent sports
authority, and subsequently become the subject of an appeal to the CAS, which then acts
as a court of last instance. In 2000, disciplinary cases accounted for 65% of the total
number of cases handled by the CAS.
Id. See also Reeb, supra note 67, at 37.
85. Id.; see also Court of Arbitration for Sport, Organization and Structure of the ICAS and
CAS, http://www.tas-cas.org/en/infogenerales.asp/4-3-238-1011-4-1-1/5-0-1011-3-0-0 (last visited
Oct. 27, 2009). While CAS and WADA operate at the international level, parallel agencies of each
may exist at national levels. In Floyd Landis's case, although the doping report occurred in France,
Landis was prosecuted by the USADA. His public arbitration hearing was held before a panel of
three arbitrators in Malibu, California. He then "appealed" to an international panel of CAS. See
infra Part Ill. This first-instance arbitration option is available to athletes where provided for by
national law, such as the Amateur Sports Act for U.S. athletes. Otherwise, international athletes
appeal directly to CAS. See Weston, supra note 57.
86. CAS Code, supra note 71, at Rule 47 (noting appeal to CAS may be filed "against an
award rendered by the CAS acting as a first instance tribunal if such appeal has been expressly
provided by the rules applicable to the procedure of first instance.").
87. Id. (referring to Rule 51 (Grounds of Appeal)); Id. at Rules 42-54 (Initiation of the
arbitration). See also id. at Rule 64-66 (Costs of the Procedure - noting that other than a minimum
fee, the Appeals arbitration proceedings are free of charge. Parties remain responsible for other
costs of the hearing).
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serves as President of the Panel. The Panel makes a de novo review of the
facts and the law and conducts a hearing in which the parties, witnesses, and
any experts needed are heard.88 In "the absence of a majority," the President
of the Panel is to decide the case alone. 89 The Panel prepares a reasoned,
written award, which is final and binding upon the parties. Arbitrations
under the appeals procedure do not require confidentiality, and CAS may
publish the awards, unless the parties stipulate otherwise. 90 The seat of CAS
arbitrations is Lausanne, Switzerland. 91  This is significant because,
regardless of where the physical arbitration takes place, it is considered to
occur in Switzerland. Thus, Swiss arbitration law governs.
92
4. Judicial Review and Enforcement of CAS Awards
The ability to vacate or seek judicial review of CAS awards is limited.
A former version of Rule 59 expressly allowed for challenges on "[a]n
extremely limited number of grounds" 9' if raised within thirty days of the
88. Id. at Rule 57 (Examination of the Appeal). See also Court of Arbitration for Sport,
Statutes of ICAS and CAS, available at http://www.tas-cas.org/statutes.
89. Id. at Rule 59. The CAS Code does not explain when an "absence of a majority" would
occur in a three-member panel. See id. It is thus unclear whether this provision is triggered , for
example, if all arbitrators agree on a basic result but they differ in their approach, or whether an
arbitrator must agree with both the result and the analysis of the president in order for his "vote" to
"count." See id. In such a case, the President appears to have more decisional power than the
arbitrators selected by the parties. See id. A previous version of this amended rule explained that
"this is the case particularly if each of the three arbitrators is of a different opinion." See COURT OF
ARBITRATION FOR SPORT, GUIDE TO ARBITRATION, supra note 61, at Rule 46.
90. CAS Code, supra note 71, at Rule 59. Although the CAS Rules require a written reasoned
award, they do not require the panel to disclose how individual arbitrators voted. Such disclosure
could facilitate future parties in making informed decisions about arbitrator selection.
91. Id. at Rule 28.
92. Switzerland's Federal Code on Private International Law applies to arbitrations where the
seat of the tribunal is in Switzerland. Switz. Fed. Code on Private Int'l Law, ch.12, art. 176 (1987),
available at http://www.tas-cas.org/useful-texts.
93. COURT OF ARBITRATION FOR SPORT, GUIDE TO ARBITRATION, supra note 61, at Rule 46,
59 (citing grounds such as
incompetence or irregular formation of the arbitration Panel, arbitration award going
beyond the application of which the CAS is seized or the lack of a decision on one of the
major points of the application, violation of the rights of the parties to be heard or lack of
equal treatment, and incompatibility of the award with public order
and referencing application of the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards of the New York Convention.) See NEW YORK CONVENTION, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330
UN.T.S. 38 (June 10, 1958), available at http://www.tas-cas.org/en/arbitrage.asp/4-3-293-1023-4-1-
1/5-0-1023-3-0-0/. This treaty is codified as U.S. law, and incorporated into the Federal Arbitration
Act, 9.U.S.C. § 201 (providing for enforcement of the Convention in the United States).
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award and the "only court of appeal is the Swiss Federal Tribunal. 94 As
amended, Rule 59 now altogether omits references to challenges to the CAS
awards and expressly states that:
The award ... shall be final and binding upon the parties. It may not be challenged by
way of an action for setting aside to the extent that the parties have no domicile, habitual
residence, or business establishment in Switzerland and that they have expressly excluded
all setting aside proceedings in the arbitration agreement or in an agreement entered into
subsequently, in particular at the outset of the arbitration.
9 5
The expectation of finality of CAS awards under the CAS Code,
however, does not eliminate the operation of the New York Convention or
the Swiss arbitration law, 9 6 which govern enforcement of foreign and Swiss
arbitral awards, respectively. These statutes provide that a court may deny
enforcement of an award where a party was under some incapacity, the
arbitration was not valid or violated due process, the award is beyond the
scope of the arbitration agreement, the procedure was not in accordance with
the parties' agreement, or where enforcement is deemed contrary to public
policy.97 Because the CAS Code situates the seat of CAS arbitration in
Switzerland, only Swiss courts have jurisdiction to review CAS awards,
unless otherwise provided. 98 Even if a U.S. or other foreign court were to
assert jurisdiction to vacate a CAS award under the New York Convention
94. COURT OF ARBITRATION FOR SPORT, GUIDE TO ARBITRATION, supra note 61, at Rule 46,
59.
If one of the parties refuses to execute the award of his own free will, the other party may
obtain its execution by initiating exequatur proceedings before state courts of the place of
execution. A very large number of countries are parties to the 1958 New York
Convention on the recognition and compulsory enforcement of foreign arbitration
awards .... It is therefore this agreement which governs the enforcement of awards in
most cases.
Id.
95. CAS Code, supra note 71, at Rule 59.
96. CAS awards are subject to the New York Convention, which obligates signatory countries
to enforce international arbitral awards and provides limited grounds for challenge in Article V.
Challenge to CAS awards in U.S. courts under national law, such as the Federal Arbitration Act, to
date, have not succeeded. See, e.g., Gatlin v. USADA/IAAF, 2008 WL 2567657, at *1 (N.D. Fla.
2008) (stating that the New York Convention applied). The district court in Landis III did not have
an opportunity to rule on this issue.
97. NEW YORK CONVENTION, 9 U.S.C § 201 art. V. See also Gubi, supra note 55, at 1006.
98. See Switz. Fed. Code on Private Int'l Law, ch.12, art. 191 (1987), available at
http://www.tas-cas.org/useful-texts (providing that an appeal may be taken only to the Swiss Federal
Supreme Court). See also id. at art. 190 (identifying limited appeal grounds for irregular designation
of the tribunal; erroneous jurisdiction; award beyond scope of submission; failure to respect party
equality or right to be heard; and award incompatibility with Swiss public policy).
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(or even the Federal Arbitration Act), the viability of a court remedy is
questionable. For example, international sporting federations may be
outside the reach of a U.S. court's personal jurisdiction, and thus not abide
by a U.S. court's vacatur. 99
C. Mandatory Testing of Athletes in International Competition
1. The World Anti-Doping Program
The second major force in international sport and the fight against
doping is the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), a private foundation
governed by Swiss law with headquarters in Canada.' 00  WADA
promulgates, administers, and enforces the World Anti-Doping Program
(WADP). The purposes of the WADP are:
To protect the Athletes' fundamental right to participate in doping-free sport and thus
promote health, fairness and equality for Athletes worldwide, and ... [t]o ensure
harmonized, coordinated and effective anti-doping programs at the international and
national level with regard to detection, deterrence and prevention of doping. 101
99. In Reynolds v. IAAF, the federation refused to comply with a U.S. Supreme Court order to
allow Rynolds to participate in the Olympic Games in Barcelona. See Reynolds v. IAAF, 23 F.3d
1110, 1111 (6th Cir. 1994). Ultimately, the court held the IAAF was not subject to personal
jurisdiction in Ohio, rendering Reynold's jury award void. See id. The IAAF similarly refused to
participate in U.S. court proceedings filed by Justin Gatlin, seeking to vacate a CAS award. See
Gatlin v. USADA, 2008 WL 2567657 (N.D. Fla. 2008). Landis attempted to vacate his CAS award
in U.S. District Court in Los Angeles, claiming arbitral bias under the U.S. Federal Arbitration Act,
or, alternatively, the New York Convention. See Landis v. USADA, Amended Motion to Vacate
Arbitration Award, No. CV-08-06330, at 11 (C.D. Cal. filed Nov. 3, 2008). The case raised the
question of whether the U.S. court had subject matter jurisdiction, as Landis alleged, under 28
U.S.C. § 1332, or whether objections could only be raised in the Swiss Federal Tribunal. See id.
Landis' attorneys argued that although CAS rules authorize appeal only to the Swiss Federal
Tribunal, CAS rules do not preempt an athlete's rights under either the FAA or the New York
Convention. Id. at 1:8-10. This case was settled before the court ruled on this issue. Id. The
USOC, in a brief submitted in Gatlin, argued that the New York Convention governed. Response of
Defendant U.S. Olympic Comm. to Plaintiff's Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and
Preliminary Injunction at 2, Gatlin v. USADA, No. 3:08cv241LAC/EMT (N.D. Fla. June 22, 2008).
100. WADA was formed following a World Conference convened by the IOC in 1999. David
Howman, Sanctions Under the World Anti-Doping Code 1 (Nov. 12, 2003) (unpublished paper
presented at Australian and New Zealand Sports Law Conference), available at http://www.wada-
ama.org/rtecontent /document/LEGAL_sanctionshowman.pdf. WADA members or "stakeholders"
are comprised of "governments or public authorities of the world, and.., the Olympic Movement or
private international sporting bodies." Id. WADA headquarters are in Montreal, Canada, with a ten
member Executive Committee and thirty-five member Foundation Board. Id.
101. WADC 2009, supra note 2, at i.
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WADP is structured into three levels.'0 The first level of WADP is the
World Anti-Doping Code (Code). Effective since 2004, with a revised Code
in effect since January 2009, the Code "[i]s the fundamental and universal
document upon which the [WADP] in sport is based."' 1 3  The Code is
designed to provide a framework "for harmonized anti-doping policies,
rules, and regulations within sport organizations and among public
authorities."' 04 The Code sets forth specific anti-doping rules, definitions of
doping, burdens of proof, prohibited substances and methods, and addresses
standards for testing, sample analysis, sanctions, appeals, confidentiality,
reporting, and statute of limitations.' 5 Pursuant to the Code, WADA is
authorized to appeal to CAS on rulings by anti-doping organizations in the
adjudication of doping cases. 0 6  Accordingly, WADA assumes an active
role monitoring compliance with the Code. 107
The Olympic Charter has been amended to require all members of the
Olympic Movement to adopt and implement the Code to remain in the
Olympic Games. l' The Code also has international recognition in the
International Convention Against Doping in Sports (ICADIS), adopted in
102. Id. at 12. See also, World Anti-Doping Agency, Q&A on the Code, http://www.wada-
ama.org/en/dynamic.ch2?pageCategory.id=367 (last visited Oct. 27, 2009) (What is the Anti-Doping
Code?).
103. WADC 2009, supra note 2, at 11.
104. WADC 2003, supra note 2, at 6.
105. USADA, Harmonization Through the World Anti-Doping Program, PLAY TRUE, Issue 3,
at 5 (2005).
106. WADC 2009, supra note 2, at art. 13.1.1 (WADA Not Required to Exhaust Internal
Remedies).
107. See generally WADC 2009, supra note 2. In addition to its monitoring role, WADA has
powers of intervention in ensuring that Therapeutic Use Exemptions (TUEs) are consistently
granted. Id. at art. 4.4. WADA is also authorized to accredit laboratories, and to prepare the annual
List of Prohibited Substances and Methods. WADA's work also includes education, awareness, and
research programs. Id. at art. 3.
108. Id., Comment, at 11. Note also that "[s]ince many governments cannot be legally bound
by a non-governmental document, they are implementing the Code by ratifying the International
Convention against Doping in Sport, an international treaty that was unanimously approved by 191
governments at UNESCO's General Conference in October 2005." See Frank Oschutz,
Harmonization of Anti-Doping Code Through Arbitration: The Caselaw of the Court of Arbitration
for Sport, 12 MARQ. SPORTS L. REv. 675, 676 (2002). See also USADA, International Standards:
Key Changes, PLAY TRUE, Issue 3, at 9, 14 (2008) (noting IOC power to exclude non-compliant
sports from the Olympic program).
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2005 by the General Conference of the United Nations Economic, Social,
and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). 109
Prior to adoption of the Code by all sporting bodies, the testing and
standards of what constituted prohibited substances were disjointed and
varied by sport federation rule.11° Thus, for example, Ross Rebagliati, the
first gold medalist in snowboarding at the 1998 Winter Games, tested
positive for marijuana. Yet, he successfully averted a doping sanction
because CAS ruled that the International Skiing Federation had not specified
marijuana as a prohibited substance."' By contrast, a British athlete was
forced to forfeit a silver medal due to alleged cannabis use because the
International Skating Federation had adopted the IOC Medical Code, which
listed cannabis as prohibited." 2  Since the world sport community's
adoption of the Code and harmonization of the doping rules across sports," 1
3
the viability of an athlete eliminating sanction upon a positive test report has
dimmed dramatically. 1 4  In the time period from 2001 to 2007, only one
athlete had been successful in challenging a doping charge brought by
USADA." 5  The grounds upon which that athlete prevailed-proving
violation of the rule that a different lab analyst perform testing of the
109. WADC 2009, Comment, supra note 2, at 11; UNESCO, International Convention Against
Doping in Sports (2005), available at
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0014/001425/142594m.pdf#page=2. Signatory nations to the
Convention commit to enforcement of the Code. See Robyn R. Goldstein, Note, An American in
Paris: The Legal Framework of International Sport and the Implications of the World Anti-Doping
Code on Accused Athletes, 7 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 149, 159 (2007) (noting WADA advisory role
and lobbying for ratification of the international convention); Michael Straubel, Is the International
Convention Against Doping in Sport the Missing Link to USADA Being a State Actor and WADC
Coverage of U.S. Pro Athletes?, 19 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 63 (2008). (reporting that approximately
eighty-six countries, including the United States, have ratified ICADIS).
110. World Anti-Doping Agency, A Brief History of Anti-Doping, http://www.wada-
ama.org/en/dynamic.ch2?page Category.id=312. See also Foschi, supra note 5, at 461.
111. See Richard McLaren, CAS Doping Jurisprudence: What Can We Learn?, 1 INT'L SPORTS
L. REV. 4 (2006), available at http://www.wada-ama.org/rtecontent/document/McLarenjleam.pdf.
112. See Oschutz, supra note 108, at 675 (noting that no athletes were charged with doping
during the 1994 Games in Lillehamer, Norway).
113. McLaren, supra note Ill,at4.
114. Effective in 2004, the Code has been adopted by over countries, and all members of the
Olympic Movement "as the basis for the fight against doping in sport[s]." Oschutz, supra note 108,
at 676 (noting acceptance of the Code by more than 570 sports organizations, including all 35
international sports federations, all national committees, the IOC, and many other sports
organizations). See also Howman, supra note 100, at I (noting acceptance by eighty-seven
countries).
115. See USADA v. Jenkins, AAA No. 30 1900019907(2008).
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athlete's 'A' and 'B' samples-has since been revised and acceptable under
the 2009 Code.116
The second level of the WADP involves four International Standards
that work in conjunction with the Code to provide uniformity among all
sports and countries in specific technical and operational areas. The first is
the List of Prohibited Substances and Prohibited Methods (List) which
specifies what constitutes doping." 7 WADA is authorized to revise the List
"whenever the need arises" and publishes the List at least annually, while
also maintaining a current list on its website." 8 Second, the International
Standards for Testing (IST) addresses the process for effective testing,
maintaining sample identity and integrity, and athlete notification." 9 Third,
the International Standards for Laboratories (ISL) is intended "[t]o ensure
production of valid test results and evidentiary data to achieve uniform and
harmonized results and reporting from accredited laboratories."' 120  Fourth,
the International Standard for Therapeutic Use Exemptions (TUE) sets forth
the process and circumstances for authorizing an athlete needing medication
for particular documented medical conditions or illnesses. 12 1  While
compliance with the Code and International Standards is mandatory, WADP
includes a precatory third level Models of Best Practices and Guidelines,
offering guidance to stakeholders relating to implementation of the Code. 1
22
116. See USADA, Harmonization Through the World Anti-Doping Program, supra note 105, at
12.
117. WADC 2009, supra note 2, at art. 4.2.1.
118. Id., Comment, at art. 4.1; see id., Comment, at art. 4.2.1 ("There will be one Prohibited
List. The substances which are prohibited at all times would include masking agents and those
substances which, when [u]sed in training, may have long-term performance enhancing effects such
as anabolics.").
119. Id. at art. 5. The 2009 Code includes new clauses addressing RTP. See id. at 37.
120. WORLD ANTI-DOPING AGENCY, INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS FOR LABORATORIES § 1.0
(2009), http://www.wada-
ama.org/rtecontent/document/IntemationalStandard-forLaboratories-v6_0_January-2009.pdf; see
also WADC 2009, supra note 2, at art. 6.
121. Id. at art. 4.4 (providing that "[e]ach International Federation shall ensure.., a process is
in place whereby Athletes with documented medical conditions requiring the Use of a Prohibited
Substance ... may request a therapeutic use exemption.").
122. WADC 2009, Purpose, Scope, & Organization of the World Anti-Doping Program & the
Code, supra note 2, at 12-13. The 2009 Code also created a new standard for privacy protection,
ISPPPI. USADA, Harmonization Through the World Anti-Doping Program, supra note 105, at 5.
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2. Doping Defined
Athletes are personally responsible for ensuring compliance with the
Code. 123 Athletes are routinely and randomly tested both in and out of
competition for prohibited substances.12 4  The presence "[o]f a Prohibited
Substance or its [m]etabolites or [m]arkers in an [a]thlete's bodily
specimen" constitutes a doping violation. 1'5 This is a strict-liability rule, as
"[i]t is not necessary that intent, fault, negligence or knowing Use on the
Athlete's part be demonstrated in order to establish an anti-doping
violation .... ,,126 Liability applies, even in cases where the equities favor
the athlete and the result was caused by inadvertent use, mislabeling, or
faulty medical advice, although these factors may mitigate the sanction.127
A doping violation also occurs where an athlete has used, attempted to use,
possessed a Prohibited Substance or Method, refused or failed to submit to
testing, tampered with doping control, failed to provide whereabouts
information or engaged in the administration or trafficking of any Prohibited
Substance or Method. 128
3. Doping Control Administration and Adjudication by ADOs
All sporting federations and governing bodies have incorporated
WADA rules into their respective regulations and are formally responsible
for enforcement of anti-doping rules. 129 In terms of practical management,
123. WADC 2009, supra note 2, at art. 2.1. The Anti-Doping Rules are very explicit in stating
that, "It is each Athlete's personal duty to ensure that no Prohibited Substance enters his or her
body." Id. at art. 2.1.1.
124. Id. at art. 2.4. Athletes are accustomed to random testing. See, e.g., World Anti-Doping
Agency, Anti-Doping Rule Violations, art. 2.4 (2006), http://www.wada-
ama.org/rtecontent/document/LEGAL-codeappendix.pdf (commentary stating that "[u]nannounced
out-of-competition testing is at the core of effective Doping Control"); Jared Ebom, Levi's Not Blue:
Utah's Leipheimer Relaxing After Big Cycling Season, DESERT MORNING NEWS, Sept. 28, 2007,
available at http://deseretnews.com/article/1,5143,695213860,00.html (quoting cyclist Levi
Leipheimer, "We get tested all the time. They show up at your door unannounced and test you.
We're tested before races and after races. We're tested all the time."). But some athletes, such as
tennis great Rafael Nadal, complain it is onerous. See Testers Treat Us Like Criminals, Feb. 12,
2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/sport/2009/feb/12/rafael-nadal-drugs-test-criminals-olympic-andy-
murray (last visited Oct. 27, 2009).
125. WADC 2009, supra note 2, at art. 2.1. See also id. at art. I ("Doping is defined as the
occurrence of one or more of the anti-doping rule violations set forth in Article 2.1 through 2.8 of the
Code.").
126. Id. at art. 2.1.1. See also Connolly, supra note 8, at 179, n.66.
127. See WADC 2009, supra note 2, Comment, at art. 2.1.1.
128. Id. at arts. 2.2-2.8.
129. Howman, supra note 100, at 1-2.
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these sporting entities typically delegate this responsibility by contracting
with national anti-doping agencies (NADOs) to conduct all testing and
adjudicate challenges. NADOs thus have jurisdiction over athletes in the
NADOs country, as well as those "who are nationals"'130 to conduct target
testing and testing without advance notice. 3 '
Testing is generally conducted from an analysis of two urine samples
provided by the athlete. Samples are sent to a WADA-accredited laboratory
which tests the 'A' doping control sample and reports results in accordance
with the ISL. 132  Testing protocols provide that lab results showing an
Adverse Analytical Finding (AAF) be reported to the NADO, which then
conducts an initial review to ensure no TUE or ISL departure.'3 3 Thereafter,
the NADO is to notify the athlete of the AAF and the anti-doping rule
allegedly violated. 114 This notification should also inform the athlete of his
right to request an analysis of the 'B' Sample, as well as the opportunity for
the athlete or his representative "to attend the B Sample opening and
analysis.., and to request copies of the A and B Sample laboratory
documentation package."13'  The athlete's own expert may observe the
testing of the 'B' sample but may not perform independent testing. The
testing process does not permit impartial peer review. 136 Upon notice of the
initial AAF, an athlete is subject to mandatory provisional suspension by the
federation. This also generally triggers team suspension and elimination of
institutional support through the NGB or NOC. 13 7  The alleged doping
violation becomes public, often reported by the press. Realistically, guilt is
presumed. 138 It is at this point that the athlete has the right to request
arbitration to contest the doping charge.
130. WADC 2009, supra note 2, at art. 5.1. See also Fitzgerald, supra note 36, at 236 n.169
(explaining that athletes are subject to the testing jurisdiction of the NADO of their home country as
well as of the NADO in which the athlete is present).
131. WADC 2009, supra note 2, at art. 5.1.
132. Id. at art. 6.1.
133. Id. at art. 7.1 (Results Management Process).
134. Id. at art. 7.2.
135. Id. The documentation package includes information under the ISL. See infra Part
III.A.2.
136. McLaren, supra note 8, at 5.
137. WADC 2009, supra note 2, at art. 7.5.1 (provisional suspension). See also id. at art. 7.5.2
(regarding athlete right to provisional hearing prior to suspension).
138. See Goldstein, supra note 109, at 158.
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The prosecuting authority in a doping arbitration is the athlete's sporting
federation, which delegates responsibility to a WADA agency. 139 USADA,
a non-profit corporation, has authority for drug testing and prosecution of
alleged violations committed by U.S. athletes, even where the alleged
doping violation occurred abroad.140 According to its website, "USADA's
process eliminates the NGB involvement in sanctioning their own
athlete."' 141  The hearing process is conducted before the North American
division of CAS, in accordance with the AAA Rules on Olympic
Arbitration, with the option for direct or final decision through CAS.
14 2
Again, "CAS decisions are final and binding except for any review required
by law applicable to the annulment or enforcement of arbitral awards." 143
4. Sanctions, Mitigation, and Aggravation
The sanctions for a doping violation include disqualification, forfeiture,
and a period of ineligibility. A doping violation arising from an in-
competition test includes the athlete's automatic disqualification from the
event, including forfeiture of any medals, points, and prizes. 44  This
139. Technically, the international sporting federation delegates to the NGB responsibility for
adjudication of anti-doping violations. The NGBs contract these enforcement responsibilities to
USADA. The NGB remains obligated to enforce the CAS decision upon the athlete from the
USADA adjudication. So essentially, the IF and NGB are in a prosecutorial role, rather than a role
to represent or defend the athlete. This role has caused confusion among some athletes, who
believed their membership with and payment of dues to the NGB would enable the NGB to "act as
sort of a union to represent the interests of cyclists .... See Neal Rogers, Mr. Rogers'
Neighborhood: Landis Lashes Out, VELONEWS, Jan. 18, 2008, available at
http://beta.velonews.com/article/71315.
140. See Landis I, supra note 18, at 5. For example, the USADA prosecuted Floyd Landis
although the testing, competition, and alleged violation took place in France. Id. at 5, 7.
141. American Arbitration Association, Online Library, at 4,
http://www.adr.org/si.asp?id=4700 (last visited Oct. 27, 2009). See also American Arbitration
Association, supra note 53, at R-4.
142. See supra Part II.B.3. See also American Arbitration Association, supra note 53.
143. WADC 2009, Comment, supra note 2, at art. 13.2.1. See also id., Comment, at art. 13
("The object of the Code is to have anti-doping matters resolved through fair and transparent internal
processes with a final appeal .... [Diecisions by [ADOs] are made transparent in Article 14.
Specified Persons and organizations, including WADA are then given the opportunity to appeal
those decisions."). "The definition of interested Persons and organizations with a right to appeal
under Article 13 does not include athletes, or their federations, who might benefit from having
another competitor disqualified." Id.
144. Id. at art. 9 (including the comment to Article 9 and reference to Article 11 on
consequences to teams). See also Juliet Macur, Olympians Caught Doping Are Named, N.Y. TiMES,
Apr. 29, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/30/sports/othersports/30doping.html?-r-l&hp (last
visited Oct. 27, 2009).
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sanction extends to all team awards. 145  A two-year sanction is imposed for
an athlete's first violation of the use of prohibited substances or methods,
and a lifetime ban is imposed for a second violation. 146  Under the 2009
Code, the period of ineligibility for trafficking or administering prohibited
substances was increased to a minimum of four years extending up to a
lifetime ban. '47
The Code provides for the possible reduction or elimination of the
period of ineligibility where the athlete can establish that he or she had no
significant fault or negligence in connection with the violation. 148  This
exception is narrowly construed and limited to exceptional circumstances
beyond the fault or negligence of the athlete, where the athlete could prove,
"despite all due care, he or she was sabotaged by a competitor.,' 149  The
athlete remains responsible for keeping his or her body free from prohibited
substances, choosing medical personnel, and relying on labels. 5 ° Potential
mitigation is also available where the athlete provides substantial assistance
in discovering or establishing anti-doping violations to an "Anti-Doping
Organization, criminal authority or professional disciplinary body which
results in ... establishing a criminal offense or breach of professional rules
by another Person."'' The 2009 Code permits a sanction reduction where
an athlete "admits the commission of an anti-doping rule violation" before
145. WADC 2009, supra note 2, at art. 11. The IOC revoked the Olympic medals of Marion
Jones' teammates. See Amy Shipley, Jones Running Mates Told to Return Medals, WASH. POST,
Apr. 11, 2008, at E02, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2008/04/10/AR2008041003272.html.
146. WADC 2009, supra note 2, at art. 10.2. See also id. at art. 14 (regarding confidentiality
and reporting information concerning AAF, public disclosure, and athlete whereabouts). Id. at art.
17 (providing a statute of limitations starting eight years from date of violation).
147. Id. at art. 10.3.2.
148. Id. at art. 10.4-5 (elimination or reduction of ineligibility period under specified
circumstances, such as absence of intent or fault). See also Howman, supra note 100, at 3,4
(describing sanctions as ranging from a warning to a life ban from competition, depending upon the
type of anti-doping violation, individual circumstances in the case, the substance or quantity
detected, and recidivism).
149. WADC 2009, Comment, supra note 2, at art. 10.5.1. This does not include sabotage by an
athlete's spouse, coach, or others in his or her circle of associates.
150. Id. at art. 10.5.2. (commenting that the no fault or negligence standard would not apply "a
positive test resulting from a mislabeled or contaminated vitamin or nutritional supplement."). See
Foschi, supra note 5, at 465-68 (describing sanction of swimmer Kicker Vencill for contaminated
multi-vitamin).
151. WADC 2009, supra note 2, at art. 10.5.3 (noting that the hearing panel determines whether
suspension is appropriate and that any such exception is subject to approval by WADA and the
applicable International Federation).
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other evidence of a violation is known.' As a corollary, aggravating
circumstances or multiple violations may increase the period of ineligibility
beyond the standard first violation sanction of two to four years. 113
5. Evaluating the Doping Adjudication Process
Although the adoption of the WADA Code has helped to streamline
doping standards and procedures, the increasingly punitive nature of the
process and sanctions mandated by the Code requires greater scrutiny.' 54 A
number of CAS decisions indicate that the Tribunal is limited to enforcing
the strict doping codes as written, even where the equities appear to lie with
the athletes.'55 Ambiguity is rarely resolved in the athlete's favor. As one
CAS panel consoled, "The vicissitudes of competition, like those of life
generally, may create many types of unfairness, whether by accident or the
negligence of unaccountable Persons, which the law cannot repair."
15 6
III. THE PRECARIOUS STATE OF ATHLETE DUE PROCESS AND FAIR HEARING
RIGHTS IN DOPING ARBITRATIONS
That "life's not fair" is little consolation to an athlete whose livelihood,
reputation, and dreams have been stripped away. The procedures for doping
adjudications under the WADA Code may convey an appearance of a
neutral process; however, closer examination reveals significant procedural
and fairness shortcomings in the doping control and disciplinary arbitration
152. Id. at art. 10.5.4. This applies where the ADO has no knowledge of a violation. "It is not
intended to apply to circumstances where the admission occurs after the Athlete or other Person
believes he or she is about to be caught." Id., Comment, at art. 10.5.4.
153. Id. at art. 10.6-7 (describing aggravating circumstances to include committing the violation
as part of a doping plan or scheme, possessing multiple prohibited substances, or engaging in
deceptive conduct to avoid detection).
154. See Oliver Niggli & Julien Sieveking, Selected Case Law Rendered Under the World Anti-
Doping Code, JUSLETrER, Feb. 2006, at I (reporting that nearly 230 decisions involving doping
charges were rendered by the CAS and IFs in 2005).
155. See Connolly, supra note 8, at 193 (citing Arbitration CAS 2004/OG/003, Edwards v.
IAAF, award of 17 Aug. 2004 (involving a case where a sanctioned athlete was given glucose tablets
by her doctor)). See also McLaren, supra note 8, at 16 (non-prohibited supplements).
156. WADC 2003, Comment, supra note 2, at art. 2.1.1 (citing Arbitration CAS 94/129, Quigly
v. UIT, award of 23 May 1995, at 6). Even the U.S. federal courts have expressed sympathy for
athletes caught in this process, and yet the courts are largely powerless to remedy. See Gatlin v.
USADA, No. 3:08-cv-241/LAC/EMT, 2008 WL 2567657, at *2 (N.D. Fla. 2008) (stating "Mr.
Gatlin is being wronged, and the United States Courts have no power to right the wrong perpetrated
upon one of its citizens."). The court considered that Justin Gatlin was suspended from participating
in the Olympic trials due to a "paper-work violation" in extending a therapeutic use exemption to use
prescription medication for his recognized disability. Id.
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process to which athletes must submit. The following examines problematic
aspects of this process, the availability of legal protections, and options for
establishing a more balanced and accountable process.
A. Process Concerns with Doping Arbitrations
An accused athlete entering the doping arbitration process not only lacks
assurances of the rule of law, due process, and evidentiary protections that
exist in a civil or criminal justice proceeding, but also has to overcome
significant procedural obstacles, that do not apply in other fora.
1. Burden of Proof and Presumptions of Validity
A significant hurdle for athletes challenging a doping violation charge is
the burden of proof set out in the WADC.' 5 7 Under the WADC, the ADO
has the burden of establishing that an anti-doping rule violation has
occurred.' 58  The standard of proof is "comfortable satisfaction."' '5 9
Although a violation may be "established by any reliable means, including
through admissions, testimony or witnesses, or other documentation
evidencing a violation,"' 160 the burden is presumptively met when the doping
report is made, as most are, by a WADA-accredited laboratory. 161
The burden shifts to the athlete to rebut the presumption, for example,
by establishing a departure from an International Standard. 62 In order to
meet this burden, an athlete presumably needs access to detailed scientific
and technical information about the laboratory's testing process, sequencing,
instrumentation and methods used, the reliability and accuracy of test
157. WADC 2003, supra note 2, at art. 3.
158. Id. at art. 3.1.
159. Id. This standard of proof"is greater than a mere balance of probability but less than proof
beyond reasonable doubt." WADC 2009, supra note 2, at art. 3.1. While this standard is not used in
the U.S. common law system, it is used in civil law countries. As an international document, the
Code does blend elements of civil and common law standards. See Paul Greene, United States Anti-
Doping Agency v. Montgomery: Paving a New Path to Conviction in Olympic Doping Cases, 59 ME.
L. REv. 149, 152 (2007).
160. Landis II, supra note 20, at 7.
161. WADC 2003, supra note 2, at art 6.1 ("Doping Control Samples shall be analyzed only in
WADA-accredited laboratories .. "). Id. at art. 3.2.1 ("WADA-accredited laboratories are
presumed to have conducted Sample analysis and custodial procedures in accordance with the
International Standard for Laboratories analysis.").
162. Id. (noting the applicable standard of proof is by a balance of probability).
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results, internal protocols, chains of custody, and competency of lab
personnel. 163  Yet, access to this type of documentation is not readily
available, disclosed, or guaranteed.64
WADA recently increased the athlete's burden of proof. In the 2003
Code, an athlete successfully shifted the burden of proof "back" to the anti-
doping agency if the athlete established (by a balance of probabilities) that a
departure from an International Standard had occurred. 16 The anti-doping
agency then had to prove to the "comfortable satisfaction of the hearing
body" that the departure had not caused the adverse analytical finding. 166
Under the 2009 Code, the athlete must prove both a departure from the ISL
and that the departure "could reasonably have caused the Adverse Analytical
Finding."' 167  Only then does the burden shift back to the ADO to prove to
the comfortable satisfaction of the hearing body that the departure did not
cause the Adverse Analytical Finding.
2. Lack of Discovery Rights
Although the accused athlete has the effective burden to establish
laboratory testing error, the applicable rules do not provide the athlete with a
right of access to the vast range of information, witnesses, and scientific
expertise necessary to make that determination.'16  Athletes are only
provided, as a matter of course, with a standard Laboratory Documentation
Package, which provides basic information about test results. 169 Athletes are
163. Experienced counsel and scientific experts are generally needed to assess testing validity.
See Landis II, supra note 20, at 3-5 (listing seventeen technical issues to determine ISL departure).
In Landis 1, the arbitral panel employed a "Panel Expert" to assist in explaining the complicated
scientific information at issue. See Landis I, supra note 18, at 1, 14-15.
164. See also Andrew Goldstone, Obstruction of Justice: The Arbitration Process for Anti-
Doping Violations During the Olympic Games, 7 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 361, 383 (2006)
(noting that access to discovery and all relevant data and reports is not guaranteed by the governing
rules).
165. WADC 2003, supra note 2, at art 3.2.1. Under the 2003 Code, the burden then shifted
back to the ADO to show that any such departures "[d]id not cause the Adverse Analytical Finding."
Id.
166. Id. at art. 3.1., 3.2, 3.2.1, 3.2.2.
167. WADC 2009, supra note 2, at art. 3.2.1.
168. See, e.g., Landis II, supra note 20, at n.7 (A laboratory "is not required to support an
Adverse Analytical Finding by producing, either to the Testing Authority or in response to discovery
requests related to the hearing, standard operating procedures, general quality management
documents (e.g., ISO compliance documents) or any documents not specifically required by
Technical Document on Laboratory Documentation Packages.") (emphasis in original).
169. See WADA PROJECT TEAM, WADA TECHNICAL DOCUMENT-TD2003LDOC 1 (2004)
("Laborator[ies] [are] not required to support an Adverse Analytical Finding by producing standard
operating procedures, general quality management documents or any other documents not
specifically [listed]."). The Documentation Package is to contain the 'A' and the 'B' Sample
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then beholden to the discretion of the arbitral panel to grant additional
discovery and inspection. In the Landis case, USADA resisted a number of
discovery requests and a battle ensued over turnover obligations,
culminating in retaliatory motions, including a "Motion to Return the Urine"
and USADA's request to expand testing to 'B' samples from other stages of
the Tour race where 'A' tests did not test positive. 170
The doping rules do not provide opportunities to depose lay or expert
witnesses. Of the fifteen expert witnesses who testified in the Landis I
arbitration, none provided opinions in advance.' 7 ' The inability to depose
adverse witnesses also tests the power of the arbitration panel, which has
subpoena but no contempt powers. Former three-time Tour de France
winner Greg Lemond, who testified on behalf of USADA, but refused to
answer questions on cross-examination, provoked this distressing statement
from Howard Jacobs, one of Floyd Landis' lead attorneys:
This is where arbitration, as a concept, fails in a case like this. Because in a civil lawsuit,
we would have the right to depose a witness and find out what he's going to answer and
not answer, and then we would file a motion in limine, and this would be kept out, rather
than having this type of thing happen in the middle of a hearing. This is completely
unfair. 172
Confirmation Procedure Data. Id. at 3. See also Landis I, supra note 18, at 1, 13 (dissent) (citing
ISL, sec. 7.0 "Requirements for supporting an Adverse Analytical Finding in the Adjudication
Process," which provides that "[i]n support of any [AAF,] the Laboratory is required to provide the
Laboratory Documentation Package described in detail in the Technical Document on Laboratory
Documentation Packages."). Interestingly, USADA relied upon documents and testimony, which
were not included in the document package, to rebut Landis's chain of custody challenges. See
WADA PROJECT TEAM, supra, at 3.
170. See Landis I, supra note 18, at 16. The majority ultimately relied upon this additional
testing which indicated positive results as grounds to establish the doping violation. See id. at 10.
See also United States v. Thomas, 545 F. Supp. 2d 1018 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (noting that USADA
protocol provides that "urine samples remain the property of USADA.").
171. See Landis I, supra note 18, at 15.
172. HOWARD JACOBS, TRANSCRIPT OF LANDIS 1 637. LeMond provided almost surreal
testimony in the course of this doping hearing. See Bonnie D. Simone, LeMond Says He Was
Threatened Not to Testify, ESPN.com, May 18, 2007,
http://sports.espn.go.com/oly/cycling/news/story?id=2873907 (last visited Oct. 27, 2009).
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Discovery in doping arbitration is intended to be limited.'73 However,
neither CAS nor WADA rules guarantee discovery or require disclosure of
or access to relevant data and witnesses, making it difficult to ascertain
laboratory compliance. Limited discovery and opportunity to depose
witnesses could streamline the hearing process and adherence to strict
timelines in complex scientific cases. 174 In some cases, additional discovery
is necessary to permit a fair hearing.
3. Lack of Access to Expertise & the WADA "Code of Silence"
WADA laboratory directors have been regularly called to testify on
behalf of the ADOs in numerous cases. 175  Under the WADA "Code of
Ethics," in effect until January 2009, laboratory directors were prohibited
from testifying in defense of an athlete. This rule provided that:
The Laboratory should not engage in analytical activities or expert testimony that would
intentionally question the integrity of the individual or the scientific validity of work
performed in the anti-doping program .... The Laboratory should not provide [testing
services in defense of an Athlete in a Doping Control Adjudication]. 176
Attorneys in Landis I characterized this rule as a "Code of Silence,"
creating an impermissible conflict-of-interest. The rule does pose a
significant restriction on an athlete's ability to meet its burden of
establishing testing errors. Under this rule, athletes are left to scour world-
wide for expert witnesses who are not affiliated with WADA laboratories to
173. See McLaren, supra note 8, at 5. See also Nathan Reierson, Comment, Out of Bounds?
Applicability of Federal Discovery Orders Under 28 U.S.C. Section 1782 by International Athletic
Governing Bodies for Use in Internal Dispute Resolution Procedures, 19 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV.
631 (1999) (contending that federal discovery statute applies in international arbitrations thus
entitling parties to obtain evidence from third parties located within the United States). The FAA
also contains an evidence-related provision which gives an arbitrator the right to direct witnesses to
appear, produce documents for arbitration, or both, which applies to arbitrations held in the United
States. Id. at 650. See 9 U.S.C § 7 (2006) ("The arbitrators ... may summon in writing any person
to attend before them or any of them as a witness in a proper case to bring with him or them any
book, record, document, or paper which may be deemed material as evidence in the case."). See also
In re Medway Power Ltd., 985 F. Supp. 402 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); In re National Broad. Co., No. 1998
WL 1994 at *1, n.173 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (citing In re Wilander, No. 1996 WL 421938 (E.D. Pa.
1996)).
174. One of the bases for the CAS panel's decision to impose the $100,000 penalty in Landis H
was that he called French witnesses to appear but was unable to question them during the hearing
due to insufficient time. Landis II, supra note 20, at 55. A pre-hearing telephone deposition of
named witnesses could possibly obviate the need for calling unnecessary witnesses. See id.
175. See, e.g., Landis I, supra note 18 (Three WADA laboratory directors testified on behalf of
USADA).
176. WORLD ANTI-DOPING AGENCY, INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS FOR LABORATORIES, Annex
B, at 4.3, 4.4 (2008), http://www.wada-ama.org/rtecontent/document/lab_08LV_05.pdf.
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opine on the compliance of a particular WADA-accredited laboratory.'7 7
The opinions and credentials of such unaffiliated experts, however, are
routinely criticized due to their lack of experience with WADA-specific
practices, as compared to the vast experience and apparent credibility of the
ADO's experts who head WADA-accredited laboratories.7 8  After the
Landis case, the rule was amended to state: "If Laboratory staff is requested
by either party or the tribunal to appear before an arbitration or court
hearing, they are expected to provide independent, scientifically valid expert
testimony. Laboratory experts should not be an advocate to either party."' 7 9
This amended rule recognizes that laboratory staff may be called as
witnesses, but does not permit them to counsel or assist an athlete. The
ability of an athlete to assess and meet his burden of establishing laboratory
errors in analytical positive cases is thus nearly insurmountable, particularly
without the ability to enlist the assistance of qualified experts.
4. The "So What" Factor: ISL Errors Not Fatal
An accused athlete has the significant burden of establishing that his or
her testing result involved a departure from International Standard practices.
Yet even where this burden is met, victory is not assured. The majority in
Landis I agreed that the Landis team demonstrated that the French
laboratory's practices did not conform to International Standards. The Panel
admonished the laboratory, that "if this happens next time. . ." such
177. For example, the arbitral panel discounted the testimony of Landis' expert, Dr.
Goldberger, who "had no experience with chain of custody requirements under the ISL, although he
was familiar with the chain of custody in his own laboratory work which was mostly related to drunk
driving (criminal law) and post-mortem work." Landis I, supra note 20, at 32.
178. See id. at 10;
According to the testimony of the Respondent's experts, the standards in [DUI and drug
testing] labs appear to be of a higher and more rigorous basis than those of the WADA
accredited labs. Such facilities also do not have the benefit of the presumption found in
Article 18 of the UCI Regulations to the effect that they are presumed to have conducted
the sample analysis in accordance with the ISL and other WADA documentation. The
antidoping laboratories have a shelter from the standards of other types of labs in the
form of this presumption. It may be that as a consequence some more relaxed procedures
are acceptable. That is not a matter for this Panel to consider but for the WADA to
contemplate.
Landis I, supra note 18, at 66.
179. WORLD ANTI-DOPING AGENCY, INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS FOR LABORATORIES, supra
note 120, at § 5.0.
37
33
Weston: Doping Control, Mandatory Arbitration, and Process Dangers for Ac
Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2010
practices and failures could warrant an acquittal for the athlete.1 80 This
seemed to provide an opening (or false hope) for Landis in seeking a de
novo review to the international CAS panel, which ultimately regarded these
practices as "less than ideal" or "minor procedural imperfections," but
insufficient to rebut the presumption that the lab conducted its analysis in
accordance with ISL.' The 2009 Code cements the higher burden in
requiring that the athlete prove not only ISL departures, but that such
departures could "reasonably have caused the Adverse Analytical
Finding.
'112
The athlete's experience in the sporting anti-doping adjudication system,
was characterized by CAS arbitrator Jan Paulsson, as follows:
Typically, the exclusive jurisdiction of sporting authorities is set down in the by-laws of
federations which grant licences to compete in the course of a season or admission to
participate in specific events. The federation in question has generally existed for
decades if not generations, and has, without any outside influence, developed a more or
less complex and entirely inbred procedure for resolving disputes. The accused
participant, on the other hand, often faces the proceedings much as a tourist would
experience a hurricane in Fiji: a frightening and isolated event in his life, and for which
he is utterly unprepared. The same may of course be said for most litigants in ordinary
court proceedings. The difference is that whereas in the latter context the accused may be
represented by experienced practitioners who appear as equals before the court, the
procedures devised by most sports federations seem to be so connected to the
180. See Landis 1, supra note 18, at 77 ("The Panel ... note[s] that the forensic corrections of
the Lab reflect[s] sloppy practice on its part. If such practices continue, it may well be that in the
future an error like this could result in the dismissal of an AAF finding by the Lab.").
181. See Landis II, supra note 20, at 48, 53. See also Landis 1, supra note 18, at 76
(acknowledging that the athlete demonstrated an ISL departure, but determining that such did not
cause the AAF). The Panel in Landis 11 similarly acknowledged that there were errors in the
Documentation Package, yet determined these "administrative" errors were insignificant or later
corrected. See Landis II, supra note 20, at 34. The CAS Panel did not rule in Landis' favor on the
"minor procedural imperfections" it conceded existed (imperfections that gave the AAA significant
pause); rather, it assessed a $100,000 penalty against him, in part because he did not win on these
issues. See id. at 53-54.
The Panel awards costs of USD 100,000 to Respondent because... [a]lthough the
Appellant had the right to pursue a comprehensive de novo appeal in such an important
matter, all of its multiple defenses have been rejected as unfounded. All that Appellant
has established after a wide-ranging attack on LNDD is that there were some minor
procedural imperfections.
Id.
An athlete should be able to rely on the accuracy of Documentation Package. Perhaps an athlete
such as Landis would have not pursued costly challenges had he not been rightly suspicious of errors
apparent in the initial documentation. That the errors were later explained in litigation should weigh
against the party who provided the erroneous information.
182. WADC 2009, supra note 2, at art. 3.2.1.
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organisation that no outsider has the remotest chance of standing on an equal footing with
his adversary-which is of course the federation itself. 183
B. Do Constitutional Protections Apply in Doping Proceedings?
The foregoing list of process concerns in doping adjudications is not
exhaustive but provokes thought on what legal protections might apply in
this area. 1 4  Sports governing bodies, which regulate participation in the
Olympic movement, essentially "hold a monopolistic 'quasi-public' position
in their relation with athletes."'' 85  The doping control and private
adjudicatory process in place to determine whether an athlete is "guilty of
doping'' 86 implicate a range of fundamental rights for athletes. An athlete's
right to work in his or her chosen profession, 87 economic and liberty rights,
and potential exposure to criminal charges in domestic and foreign courts all
are at stake in this process.
To date, these entities have been accorded legal treatment and status as
private associations subject to private, rather than public or constitutional,
standards of law where courts are reluctant to interfere. 88  Efforts to
characterize the USOC as a "state actor" have been unsuccessful, despite
significant interaction or "entwinement" between Congress and the
USOC.' 89 The debate is still relevant, particularly as USADA increases its
183. Jan Paulsson, Arbitration of Sports Law Disputes, 9(4), ARB. INT'L 359, 361 (1993)
(emphasis added).
184. See infra Parts I1I.B-C. See also Hiltzik, supra note 8, at Al.
185. See Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler & Antonio Rigozzi, Legal Opinion on the Conformity of
Article 10.6 of the 2007 Draft World Anti-Doping Code with Fundamental Rights of Athletes 2.7,
Nov. 13, 2007, http://www.wada-
ama.org/rtecontent/document/Legal-Opinion-Conformity-1 0_6 complete.document.pdf.
186. This is the term used in CAS arbitral rulings. See Connolly, supra note 8, at 182 (noting
that the "guilty of doping" determination does not distinguish between intentional and unintentional
violations).
187. See Straubel, supra note 16, at 546 (stating that "Olympic caliber athletes now earn a
living and make a career of their sport."). Athletes participating in Olympic and international-level
sports are no longer limited to amateurs. See id. Nearly all federations have amended their
eligibility rules to include professionals. See id.
188. See Michels v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 741 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1984) (Posner, J., concurring)
("[T]here can be few less suitable bodies than the federal courts for determining the eligibility, or the
procedures for determining the eligibility, of athletes to participate in the Olympic Games.").
189. See, e.g. S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm, 483 U.S. 522, 545 n.27
(1978); DeFrantz v. U.S. Olympic Comm , 492 F. Supp. 1181, 1194 (D.D.C. 1980) (holding that
USOC is an independent body and facts did not support claim that the federal government has a right
39
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efforts to work in tandem with federal and state law enforcement on anti-
doping investigations and as the International Convention Against Doping in
Sport (ICADIS), recognizing the WADC, has achieved treaty status. 190
1. Are USADA Disciplinary Proceedings "State Action"?
U.S. Constitutional standards for due process apply in domestic doping
arbitrations if these proceedings constitute "state action." Under the three-
part test in Mathews v. Eldridge, athletes may be fairly characterized to have
a protected property and liberty interest in their participation in competitive
sports as a profession as well as in endorsements and their reputation, which
can be devastated by doping allegations.' 9' Additionally, a significant risk
of erroneous deprivation of an athlete's right to compete arises because of
the designated presumption of test validity and burden-shifting upon the
athlete, without specific entitlement to discovery or scientific expertise, to
impeach the results. 19
2
The crux of a due process right depends upon USADA's status as a
"state actor."' 193 An ostensibly private actor can take on the status and
to control it). These cases were decided years before Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch.
Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 291 (2001).
190. See UNITED STATES ANTI-DOPING AGENCY, 2007 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 13, at I
(noting the agency's increasing cooperation with law enforcement authorities as a new dimension in
curtailing the use of performance-enhancing drugs and describing operational "raids"). The
USADA's nearly undefeated streak is likely to continue as it partners with pharmaceutical
companies to create markers to identify for prohibited substances. See Drug-Maker Cooperated with
WADA, VELO NEWS, July 23, 2008, available at http://tour-de-france.velonews.conarticle/80607.
Moreover, the USADA has worked with federal investigators on doping-related charges. See United
States v. Graham, 555 F. Supp. 2d 1046, 1048 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (granting motion to compel
documents from USADA). Antonio Pettigrew was subpoenaed and forced to testify under penalty
of perjury at the trial of his former coach Trevor Graham. See Josh Dubow, Jury Deliberates in
Graham Steroids Case, available at http://www.signonsandiego.com/sports/20080527-1624-ca-
athletessteroids.html (stating that the government was forced to subpoena evidence in Graham's case
and that Antonio Pettigrew was one of the witnesses against Graham). Likewise, cyclist Joe Papp
was asked to testify against Floyd Landis and has been the subject of ongoing Drug Enforcement
Agency investigations. See Andrew Tilin, Vanishing Point, OUTSIDE MAGAZINE, June 2008,
available at http://outside.away.com/outside/culture/200806/j oe-papp-cycling-doping-l .html.
191. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (setting forth a three factor test for
determining whether a particular procedure violated due process in a given situation: (1) identify the
private interest to be affected; (2) determine the risk of erroneous deprivation with the existing
procedures as well as the probable value of additional procedures; and (3) detail the governmental
interest, including any fiscal or administrative burden on the government). See Straubel, supra note
16, at 546.
192. See id. at 548-51.
193. Compare McCaffrey, supra note 9, at 648 (arguing that current USADA doping
adjudications using the 'comfortable satisfaction' standard of proof may be characterized as state
action) with Dionne L. Koller, Does The Constitution Apply to the Actions of the United States Anti-
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obligations of a state actor. Various tests for defining governmental action
consider the interdependence between the private and public entity. 194 Paul
McCaffrey has argued that USADA qualifies as a "state actor" under the
"state compulsion" test, which asks whether the government has coerced or
encouraged the private entity to engage in the challenged conduct.195 He
asserts that the federal government encourages the doping policing activities
by helping USADA to obtain information about its doping cases. 196 He cites
the BALCO steroid scandal, where the Senate subpoenaed the Department
of Justice to obtain its BALCO evidence and thereafter turned over that
evidence to USADA to be used against athletes, such as Tim
Montgomery. 197 Moreover, USADA has pledged its commitment to work
with public authorities in anti-doping efforts. 98 The WADC reinforces this
through its offer of potentially reduced sanctions to athletes who provide
"substantial assistance" to an ADO, criminal authority, or professional
disciplinary body which results in establishing a violation or criminal
offense.1 99 USADA was created by the Congressionally-chartered USOC as
a private, non-profit corporation to manage the testing and adjudication of
Doping Agency?, 50 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 91 (2005) (arguing that the U.S. Constitution does not apply
to USADA's actions because USADA is not a state actor). Another obstacle is at the international
federation or CAS level, where U.S. laws and procedural protections are not guaranteed.
194. See Defrantz, 492 F. Supp. at 1192-93. An example of such test-defining government
action is, whether:
(1) [T]he state has so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with [the
private entity] that it must be recognized as a joint participant with the challenged
activity"; or (2) "there is a sufficiently close nexus between the state and the challenged
action of the regulated entity so that the action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of
the state itself.
See DeFrantz, 492 F. Supp. at 193 (citing Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725
(1961), and Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974)).
195. See McCaffrey, supra note 9, at 664, 673-74. Professor Straubel argues that state action
by USADA may exist under a "joint activity" test because the U.S. government has created the legal
framework requiring compliance with WADC and delegated ICADIS obligations to USADA.
Straubel, supra note 190, at 72.
196. McCaffrey, supra note 9, at 657 n.92, 674.
197. ld. at 674.
198. See UNITED STATES ANTI-DOPING AGENCY, 2007 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 13, at 1.
The Mitchell Report has brought increased attention to the use of performance-enhancing drugs in
sports. Id. The Mitchell Report also recommended that professional baseball use an anti-doping
program administered by an independent organization much like what USADA does for the USOC.
Id.
199. See WADC 2009, supra note 2, at art 10.5.3.
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enforcement actions under the WADA Code.200 USADA is funded by the
USOC and U.S. government, which pays approximately sixty percent of its
budget./°l USADA has been endowed by the federal government, a
signatory to the WADA Code, to serve as the exclusive power to implement
the Code mandates upon U.S. athletes.2 2
Despite USADA's name-United States-and its prominent role in U.S.
doping enforcement actions, it remains uncertain whether USADA will be
held to governmental status and Constitutional constraints for standard
doping proceedings. 0 3 Professor Koller articulates factors supporting the
contention that USADA is not engaged in state action in the typical doping
case.20 4 First, USADA is a private entity incorporated under private articles
of incorporation and operating under its own set of bylaws. 0 5 It ultimately
operates separately from the government with no control coming from either
the federal government or the individual states, and it performs a regulatory
function that is not traditionally left to the states.20 6  Although USADA
received substantial government funding and is the official anti-doping
agency of the United States,20 7 USADA, not the government, is ultimately
responsible for making agency decisions. It is thus argued that such a
200. USADA was created "as a result of recommendations set forth by the USOC's Select Task
Force on Externalization." American Arbitration Association, Online Library, supra note 141, at 3.
USADA began operations in October 2000 with full authority for drug testing, education, research,
and adjudication for U.S. Olympic, Pan American, and Paralympic athletes." Id.
201. See UNITED STATES ANTI-DOPING AGENCY, 2007 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 13 (noting
USADA received $8 million in federal grants and $4 million from the USOC in 2007). See also
McCaffrey, supra note 9, at 650.
202. See S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 555-57 (1987)
(Brennan. J., dissenting) (believing there was a symbiotic relationship between the government and
USOC, and stating that "the USOC has been endowed by the Federal Government with the exclusive
power to serve a unique national, administrative, adjudicative, and representational role ... in the
eye of the public ... the connection between the decisions of the United States Government and
those of the [USOC] is profound.").
203. Courts are highly reluctant to interfere in matters of private sporting associations that are
part of the international Olympic structure. De Frantz v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 492 F.Supp. 1181
(D.D.C. 1980); Slaney v. Int'l Amateur Athletic Fed'n, 244 F.3d 580 (7th Cir. 2001).
204. Koller, supra note 193, at 113 (acknowledging unique circumstances for a stronger case
that USADA's conduct amounts to state action, such as when the federal government does intervene,
as it did in the months leading up to the 2004 Athens Olympic Games).
205. United States Anti-Doping Agency, Bylaws,
http://www.usantidoping.org/iles/active/policies-procedures/usada-bylaws-2009.pdf, Koller, supra
note 193, at 113-14. See also Sarah L. Horvitz, Travis Tygart, & Paul Turbow, Dopers Are Not
Duped: USADA's Assistance to Federal Prosecutors Ultimately Protecting Clean Athletes Is Not
State Action, 19 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 39, 44 (2008). See also id. at 47 (acknowledging that
"USADA regularly cooperates with the federal government in its information gathering.").
206. Koller, supra note 193, at 120-21.
207. Id. at 122.
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passive governmental role in the functioning of USADA cannot translate
into state action.20 8 Professor Straubel posits, however, that the case for
state action and potential criminalization of doping violations becomes more
compelling with the recent adoption of ICADIS. 20 9 The debate of whether
doping disciplinary proceedings are a matter of private associational law or
state action thus persists.
2. Should Criminal Law and the Sixth Amendment Apply to Doping
Cases?
Doping adjudications share many characteristics of criminal
proceedings, without the attendant protections of criminal procedure.210 For
example, the 2009 WADA Code now provides that an athlete may be
eligible for a reduced sanction for making an "admission" to doping where
the ADO lacks other evidence, or for (snitch) activity in cooperating with the
ADO or criminal authorities in the conviction of other anti-doping cases.
The Code also authorizes increased sanctions for "aggravating
circumstances., 21' If this were a judicial criminal proceeding, such
provisions would raise Constitutional concerns regarding a defendant's right
against self-incrimination and challenges to the sanctions as impermissibly
vague. The panoply of Constitutional protections would apply. Among
these, the rights against self-incrimination, to remain silent, to effective
assistance of counsel, and standards of proof beyond reasonable doubt would
be implicated. 12
208. Id. at 124. This "final [private] act" analysis seems consistent with other "non state-actor"
holdings. See supra note 58 (describing DeFrantz and San Francisco cases). Cf. Brentwood Acad.
v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288 (2001). See also Horvitz, et. al., supra note
205, at 55-57 (arguing that USADA is not a state actor under either the public function,
entanglement, or entwinement tests for state action).
209. See Straubel, supra note 109 at 63 (stating that ICADIS "[c]ould lead to, among other
things, the [USADA] being declared a state actor [and] the criminalization of doping offenses within
the United States ....").
210. See Straubel, supra note 69, at 1261 (characterizing doping hearings as "quasi-criminal.").
211. See supra Part II.B.5; WADC 2009, supra note 2, at art. 10.6.
212. McCaffrey, supra note 9, at 648 (noting that Marion Jones, under investigation by
USADA, called the agency a "secret kangaroo court," and surmising that such "dissatisfaction is
attributable in part to the similarities between criminal proceedings and doping adjudications ....
[A]n athlete might argue that constitutional due process demands the protection of the reasonable
doubt standard... [but] for due process protections to apply, the athlete must show that the USADA
is a state actor, and that its proceedings are not merely private conduct."). See also Straubel, supra
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CAS "case law," or lex sportiva, also authorizes an adverse inference to
be made from an athlete's decision not to testify.2" 3 For example, Tim
Montgomery was found guilty of doping, based not upon a positive test, but
upon "non-analytical positive" evidence of doping. USADA offered "Seven
Types of Evidence" of Montgomery's alleged participation in the BALCO
conspiracy and trading in doping substances. 214  This included documents
from files seized from BALCO, an alleged admission to a teammate that he
had used a prohibited substance, and reports in the San Francisco Chronicle
supposedly based on secret grand jury testimony by Montgomery in which
he admitted using various prohibited substances. Although it admitted
seemingly inadmissible evidence,215 the CAS panel announced it based
Montgomery's conviction solely upon the teammate's testimony that
Montgomery had asked her at a party: "Does it make your calves tight?
2
,
6
The CAS panel announced it took a negative inference from the athlete's
decision not to testify and that "it would have made a real difference if he
had said when I said 'it' I meant something else. 217  Under the U.S.
criminal justice system, the fact that a defendant seems guilty does not
excuse a process that does not comport with the law. The rationale that,
absent a state action, the doping disciplinary process is simply a matter of
private contract resolved in arbitration, does not acknowledge the reality of
the mandatory and punitive powers of of the process. As Professor Straubel
has argued, doping cases do not fit within the commercial arbitration
model.21  The quasi-criminal nature of doping hearings and sanctions
warrants a process that comports with the principles underlying
Constitutional protections for defendants in criminal cases.
note 190, at 75 (arguing that criminal sanctions aspect of drug testing could warrant protections
under the Fourth Amendment).
213. See USADA v. Collins, AAA No. 30 190 00658 04 (2004), available at
http://www.usaantidoping.org/files/active/arbitration-ulings/aaa%20cas%20decision%20-
%20collins.pdf; USADA v. Montgomery, CAS 2004/0/645 (2004). In lex sportiva, arbitrators
quote themselves and other arbitrators from prior opinions. Where arbitrators can also be in the role
of advocate in separate cases, what is "law" versus advocacy?
214. See USADA v. Montgomery, CAS 2004/0/645 (2004).
215. Arbitrators, not bound by rules of evidence or obligations to follow law, regularly admit
clearly inadmissible evidence "for what it's worth." See USADA v. Montgomery, CAS 2004/0/645
(2004).
216. Id. at 8.
217. Id. The panel interpreted "it" to mean the prohibited substance.
218. See Straubel, supra note 69, at 1215. See also Goldstone, supra note 16, at 388 ("While
the IOC is willing to apply the criminal law concepts of guilt and intent and use these concepts in
imposing punishment, it is unwilling to apply the corresponding procedural protection, choosing to
operate under private law instead.").
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C. The Right to a "Fair Hearing'" and How Doping Arbitrations Fall Short
Irrespective of the state action element and application of Constitutional
due process standards, the WADA Code provides that an athlete who is
accused of doping is entitled to a fair hearing.21 9 Individual prosecuting
anti-doping organizations are responsible for providing a hearing process to
determine whether a doping violation was committed and to impose
appropriate consequences. 2 0 The Code provides that the hearing process
respect fundamental principles, such as the athlete's right to be fairly and
timely informed of the asserted anti-doping rule violation, and a chance to
respond to such allegations; the right of each party to present evidence,
including the right to call and question witnesses (subject to the hearing
body's discretion to accept testimony by telephone or written submission); a
fair and impartial hearing panel; and a timely, written, and reasoned
decision. 22 1 The absence of clear procedural rules, disclosure obligations,
and institutional support for accused athletes undercuts the viability of a fair
hearing.
1. Represented by Counsel at Athlete's Expense
Accused athletes have "the right to be represented by counsel at the
Person's own expense. 222 This one provision, amid a process where anti-
doping authorities are securely funded, can conceivably gut the fair hearing
guarantee. As a practical matter, an athlete, on the eve or in the throes of
competition, is rarely equipped to hire competent counsel and scientific
experts to defend against a doping charge. Athletes typically rely on
recommendations from teammates or search the internet for an attorney.223
219. WADC 2009, supra note 2, at art. 8.
220. Id. See, e.g., United States Anti-Doping Agency, Protocol for Olympic Movement
Testing, supra note 44, at 41.
221. WADC 2009, supra note 2, at art. 8 (providing that each ADO may adopt its own protocol
for a hearing process consistent with these principles).
222. Id.
223. E-mail from Howard Jacobs, Esq., to Kirk Pearson, Student, Pepperdine University School
of Law (Sept. 24, 2008, 17:31 PST) (on file with author). The USOC Athlete Ombudsman is able to
provide independent advice to athletes about applicable procedures, but cannot represent the athlete
or render legal advice. See supra note 42. The Sports Law Clinic at Valparaiso University School
of Law, directed by Professor Michael Straubel and assisted by third-year law students has provided
pro bono assistance to athletes accused of doping. See Valparaiso University School of Law, Sports
Law Clinic, http://www.valpo.edulaw/clinic/sportslawclinic/index.php (last visited Oct. 27, 2009).
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Floyd Landis went to the virtual public, mounting a "Wiki Defense" and
seeking financial assistance for his defense.224 Considering the presumption
of test validity and guilt, athletes cannot realistically avail themselves of the
fair hearing procedures without legal advice.225 With the substantial
funding, experience, and resources garnered by the ADOs and CAS, an
accused athlete is at a distinct information and resource disadvantage.
The guarantee of a fair hearing rings hollow where the underlying
process rules do not guarantee access to representation, discovery, scientific
expertise, or an impartial panel. An essential component of a fair trial in a
doping disciplinary proceeding, under the Convention Against Doping of the
Council of Europe, is the right to an independent and impartial tribunal,
which means, among other things:
(a) to distinguish the suing authority from the instruction authority and from the judgment
authority; (b) to express your point of view orally and enter into a debate; (c) to have the
right of a public or private hearing; (d) to have the knowledge and right to contest the
presence of some members of the disciplinary commission when not having the
guarantees of independence and impartiality.
Simply applying subsection (a) to doping adjudications leaves one
confounded. The process set forth by the WADA Code has been criticized
for regulating all aspects of the anti-doping dispclinary regime, such that the
suing, instruction, and judgment authority are essentially one. 227
2. Arbitrator Conflicts
In his petition to vacate the CAS decision, Landis cited instances where
panel arbitrators had concomitantly served as advocates before party
attorneys, who served as CAS arbitrators on a separate matter.228 The
224. Hughes, supra note 18, at 20; Darcy C. Plymire, The Wiki Defense: Contesting the Status
of Knowledge in the Floyd Landis Doping Case, I INT'L J. SPORT COMM. 307, 314 (2008).
225. McCaffrey, supra note 9, at n.62 (stating that, "As a practical matter, the estimated cost of
a legal challenge is $60,000 to $80,000."). This may not seem like an unfair price to pay in order to
salvage a career, but one must consider that the "USADA has never lost a case." Amy Shipley,
Caught Cheating, or Was She Cheated?, WASH. POST, Nov. 8, 2004, at DOt.
226. Nathalie Korchia, Symposium, Int'l Sports Law & Business in the 21st Century,
Fundamental Guarantees with Respect to Disciplinary Proceedings-Some Reflections, 15 MARQ.
SPORTS L. REV. 29,33 (2004).
227. What evolved to protect competitive purity since then is a closed, quasi-judicial system
without American-style checks and balances. Anti-doping authorities act as prosecutor, judge and
jury, enforcing rules that they have written, punishing violations based on sometimes questionable
scientific tests that they develop and certify themselves, while barring virtually all outside appeals or
challenges. See Hiltzik, supra note 8.
228. See Landis v. USADA, Amended Motion to Vacate Arbitration Award, No. CV-08-06330
(C.D. Cal. filed Nov. 3, 2008) (asserting that "the CAS system is an insider's club, favoring repeat
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guarantees of arbitral independence and impartiality become blurred where
arbitrators are free to, and in fact do, serve as advocates representing anti-
doping organizations, sports bodies, and, occasionally, an athlete on each
other's panels.129 The CAS procedural rules require arbitrators to remain
independent and to disclose circumstances likely to affect his independence,
yet the rules do not specifically require arbitral disclosure of conflicts of
interest or previous business relationships with the advocates or parties that
would apprise a party selecting an arbitrator of its nominee or which could
provide a basis to seek removal of an arbitrator prior to a hearing. CAS has
responded to the "double hat" problem highlighted by Landis. However,
that only fifteen percent of the CAS arbitrators are selected "with a view to
safeguard the interests of the athletes" may not provide assurance of
impartiality from an athlete's perspective. As argued by a Landis
attorney, "[b]ecause arbitrators have a free rein to decide the law as well as
the facts, and because their decisions are accorded a high degree of
deference, the impartiality of those arbitrators must be scrupulously
safeguarded. 23 1
IV. PROVIDING MEANINGFUL HEARING RIGHTS
Doping adjudications are imbued with many of the elements of a civil
and quasi-criminal proceeding, without corresponding process
232protections. Arbitration. a recognized form of private dispute resolution,
can be an efficient and effective means to adjudicate disputes among
consenting parties and subject only to self-imposed rules (or lack thereof).
But the doping adjudicatory process in international sports has a tremendous
impact on the life, career, and reputation of an accused athlete. The war
against drugs and desire for expediency cannot be at the expense of
fundamental fairness. The fiction of athlete consent to this process can only
players at the expense of athletes, a disadvantage that is only exacerbated when the arbitrators on a
particular panel continue to represent clients before the CAS or seek to do so.").
229. See also Gubi, supra note 55, at 11.
230. Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS), Arbitration Statutes, at S14, http://www.tas-
cas.org/en/arbitrage-statuts.asp/4-0-1075-4-1-1/5-0-1089-7-1-1 (last visited Oct. 27, 2009). See also
Part 1I.B.2.
231. See Landis, No. CV-08-06330, at 26 (citing Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont'l Cas.
Co., 393 U.S. 145 (1968)); Straubel, supra note 69, at 1237-38 (asserting failings in the selection
process).
232. See Straubel, supra note 69.
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have credence where the process is accessible and accountable.233 As one
CAS arbitrator noted, "[t]he fight against doping is arduous, and it may
require strict rules. But the rule-makers and rule-appliers must begin by
being strict with themselves." 234 A "fair hearing" in this regulatory
environment should include elements of the following proposals.
A. Procedure and Discovery Protocols
The CAS procedural rules applicable in doping arbitration hearings
should make specific provisions regarding discovery and disclosure
obligations.235 Further, the rules should address the use of a Panel expert
and provide the right of the parties to examine the Panel expert and reports
made to the Panel.236 The CAS rules should set forth specific requirements
for arbitral disclosure of potential conflicts of interest, as well as address the
"revolving door" concern about arbitrators also representing clients as
advocates in this forum. Further, the provisions permitting arbitral panels to
impose costs upon athletes should be explicit or eliminated. Athletes, such
as Floyd Landis, should not be penalized for availing themselves of the
adjudicatory process. Further, athletes as a client should not be sanctioned
for the legal arguments or strategy of their counsel. Civil procedural rules
authorize sanctions against the lawyer, where warranted, for alleged
frivolous legal assertions. 23 7 Although not binding upon CAS, the Rule 11
analogy and prohibitions on fee-shifting in civil rights cases have force here
as well.
233.
These fundamental guarantees are what can be considered as the price of the security, of
the credibility, of the legitimacy and somehow, of the price of the right to make
decisions. Why should private commissions be entitled to judge and sometimes cause
very important injuries to individuals if they do not have any legitimacy or are not
recognized by the recipients for such a policy as a legitimate authority?
Korchia, supra note 225, at 35.
234. Landis I, supra note 18, at 13 (Campbell J., dissenting) (quoting Quigley v. Int'l Shooting
Union, CAS 94/129 (1995)) (stating, "Any anti-doping system must be held accountable, like the
athletes .... Drug testing agencies should not be playing hide the ball when athletes' careers are on
the line.").
235. See Straubel, supra note 69, at 1216 (noting the ambiguity in availability of pre-hearing
discovery).
236. In Landis 1, Dr. Francisco Botre served as the Panel Expert, with the consent of the parties.
He was present throughout the hearing, with certain exceptions, and provided the panel an extensive
report but was not called for cross-examination by the parties. See Landis 1, supra note 18, at 18,
20, 68.
237. FED. R. Civ. P. Il(b).
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B. Access to Qualified Athlete Legal Advocates
Athletes who are required to submit to mandatory drug testing, with
attendant potential criminal liability, and to mandatory arbitration should be
provided meaningful access to competent legal representation when their
athletic careers are in jeopardy. Accused athletes cannot realistically assess
whether to pursue challenges in this process without competent legal counsel
and scientific expertise. Most athletes do not have the financial resources to
do this on their own. Although there is no general "right" to counsel in civil
cases or doping adjudications,238 the fact that all other organizations within
the Olympic Movement are funded compels the suggestion for establishing a
fund, insurance, or program to assist accused athletes. Perhaps this can be
coordinated through efforts of the IOC, individual federations, or the USOC.
The resources appear available, considering the vast sums spent on staging
the Olympic Games and millions garnered from broadcast, sponsorship, and
trademark rights.3
A proposed model of athlete advisors or legal representatives can mirror
the roster system used for CAS arbitrators. So that athlete advocates can
adequately advise athletes and avoid unwarranted challenges, the athlete
advocates should receive specialized training regarding the science of testing
and doping, similar to that provided to arbitrators and doping authorities.240
C. Athletes Unite?
The high stakes and visibility of athlete doping cases has raised public
scrutiny and increased concern for fair process assurances. Many athletes
who compete in professional leagues in the United States are protected by
U.S. laws and represented through a player's association. Ironically, athletes
who represent the United States in international sports lack similar
protections.21 The formation of associations to provide for representation
238. See Bitting, supra note 45, at 677.
239. See supra Part II.A.2.
240. The function of an Athlete Advisory Council at the international level or the role of the
USOC Ombudsman could be expanded to provide access to qualified legal advisors for concerned
athletes.
241. Bitting, supra note 45, at 663. See also Martin v. Int'l Olympic Comm., 740 F.2d 670 (9th
Cir. 1984) (agreeing that plaintiff, women runners from twenty-seven countries, had demonstrated a
historical pattern of gender discrimination by the IOC in failing to hold comparable events for
women but declining to impose U.S. constitutional or state laws on an international athletic event
and deferring to procedures under the Olympic Charter).
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for international sporting athlete remains an option warranting
consideration.2 42 A recent study commissioned by the IAAF also proposed
further consideration of unionizing international athletes. 243 Many details
remain, and the logistics of organizing athletes competing internationally
and across sports is complex.244 However, means are available within the
current regulatory structure to provide guidance to concerned athletes while
further efforts warranted.
V. CONCLUSION
The timing and nature of international sporting competition often
necessitates swift resolution of eligibility disputes. CAS is logically
designed to respond. With the viability of judicial recourse extremely
limited, athletes with disciplinary and eligibility disputes must submit to
CAS arbitration. But with the power to test, sanction, and deny an athlete of
his or her sporting career, comes the obligation to provide a fair hearing
process, including assurances of impartiality, access to information, and to
legal advisors. It is about the athletes. It is about playing and judging true,
clean, and fair.
242. Straubel, supra note 69, at 1234 ("One unique solution which would require more
analysis... is the creation of monitoring groups comprised of athletes or athletes' attorneys, perhaps
akin to a union.").
243. See PROJECT 30, TASK FORCE REPORT 1, 60 (2009),
http://www.scribd.com/doc/12025159/Project-30 (encouraging promotion of self-sustaining
professional athlete's union).
244. For example, the longer career of U.S. professional athletes may make unionizing more
practical than for athletes who may compete once in the Olympics, yet the national sports governing
body can operate as a resource for the athletes.
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